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Introduction
The United States presently focuses much of its energy on the prevention of
terrorism through particular counterterrorism policies and strategies. Today, deterrence is
the primary theoretical basis for counterterrorism policies. If the United States invests so
heavily in deterrence as a counterterrorism strategy, is it successful? If not, what are its
theoretical flaws? Who is best served by efforts to prevent terrorism through a deterrent
project?
The meaning of terrorism is controversial and diverse definitions are offered from
a variety of sources from academics to geopolitical agencies. Some definitions avoid
conflating terrorism by non-state actors with state “violence” or state sponsored terrorism
(Tuman 2003). Therefore, terrorism is relegated to non-state actors and groups. However,
other academics argue that terrorism is an arbitrary term used to differentiate the same
violence used by “legitimate” states and illegitimate non-state actors. For instance,
Olivero (1998:142) suggests that terrorism encompasses its own discourse that undergoes
significant changes throughout history in its development and application. “By claiming
to be defining a type of violence, i.e., one that threatened the site of legitimate violence
(the state), it is clear that this term is reserved for the art of statecraft”. Therefore
terrorism is any violent action directed at the state and relegates state violence to another
category.
Although the meaning of terrorism is controversial and defining it in a manner
that does not recognize state violence is problematic, for the purposes of this thesis, I
define terrorism according to the terms of the U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT. The PATRIOT
ACT (Sec 802) defines terrorism as and act that is that is a violation of the criminal laws
1

of a state or the United States, if the act appears to be intended to: (i) intimidate or coerce
a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination
or kidnapping”. Similarly, U.S. criminal law now defines terrorism as the “premeditated,
politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents” (Truman 2003:6). The purpose of this thesis is to explore U.S.
counterterrorism strategy and its basis within a particular (deterrence) theoretical
perspective. Therefore, I am assuming that the U.S. basis its counterterrorism strategy off
of its definition of what is and is not terrorism.
Preventing terrorism, as a focus of U.S. domestic and international policy is based
on deterrence. What is the nature of deterrence thinking and policy? Deterrence is a
prevention strategy informed by economic and criminological theories of rational choice.
Rational choice posits that humans make decisions based on cost-benefit analysis.
Therefore, deterrence is the practice of increasing the costs or reducing the benefits of an
act in order to create disequilibrium (Becker 1968).
Assumptions about the motivation that drives human behavior including crime
and terrorism are implicit and explicit within rational choice theories. These theories
assume that human behavior is based on cost benefit analysis, or means ends rationality.
When human behavior is analyzed through cost benefit analysis, the motivation of human
actors is always the desire to increase the benefits at the least cost. Therefore, all human
behavior is rational to the extent that individuals choose those behaviors that are the most
beneficial and the least risky.
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What are the consequences of deterrence approaches to terrorism? When
terrorism is theorized as an action that is the result of a rational choice, the motivation of
terrorists is reduced to a desire to increase benefits. Therefore, analysis of terrorism focus
on individual actors making means ends decisions. However, rational choice theories and
their relationship to deterrent measures are problematic. These theories, informed by
neoclassical economic theories assume humans, at an individual level, are all rational
actors motivated by utilitarian goals. Such an approach to understanding terrorism is
unappreciative of the larger social contexts that shape behavior such as terrorism. They
rely on the assumption that all human action is the result of rational, cost benefit
calculations. Therefore, the possibility that people engage in terrorism as a collective
action is eliminated when terrorism is understood within the rational choice paradigm.
Despite the problematic nature of the theories that inform counterterrorism
deterrence policies, deterrence remains our political and economic priority as a way to
prevent terrorism. However, without understanding the larger social, political, economic
and cultural contexts in which terrorism and counterterrorism take place, we risk not only
failing to prevent terrorism, but may incite it. Further, there are various domestic and
international consequences that are the result of deterrence policies including power in
politics, economics and civil rights, and of course fueling terrorism and violence.
This thesis will argue that a more appropriate understanding of terrorism is
necessary. In order to achieve a more holistic conception of the terrorism problem, efforts
should be made politically and theoretically to incorporate international relationships that
include politics, economics and culture. Such an approach to understanding terrorism as a
collective action that is related to various social structures is not facilitated within the
3

present theoretical application of deterrence to counterterrorism. Therefore, this thesis is
a political and economic approach to understanding the relationship between theories of
terrorism and strategies of counterterrorism. If deterrence is not the most appropriate way
of addressing terrorism, then the first step to creating alternative strategies is to analyze
the deterrence policies currently in place. Therefore, this thesis is a stepping stone to
moving past present conceptions of how to address terrorism; in order to critique U.S.
counterterrorism strategy and understand why deterrence is employed as a strategy so that
we can create more suitable counterterrorism strategies.
Chapter One will present various international relations theories including world
systems analysis, polyarchy and the globalization of culture (Wallerstein 1997, Robinson
1996, Swidler 1986). First, I outline how these concepts and theories are useful for
understanding terrorism as well as our responses to terrorism. The purpose of this chapter
is to provide an understanding of terrorism within a global context; a context that is
neglected by a deterrence approach to terrorism.
In Chapter Two, I provide a detailed critique of rational choice, routine activities
and deterrence. In particular, I provide a critique of rational choice for its assumptions of
utilitarian motivation and its methodological individualism. Then, I argue for a broader
understanding of terrorist motivation that takes into account global structures of politics,
economics and culture. Finally, I present the work of various scholars who begin to move
beyond a strictly deterrence approach to understanding and addressing terrorism.
Chapter Three is a description of the various consequences of deterrence as a
counterterrorism doctrine. I demonstrate that the deterrence policies of the United States
have real political and economic consequences, not just for people in the U.S., but for
4

people around the world. In particular, I link the benefits of deterrence practices to
international elites and the costs of deterrence to those caught in the crossfire between
terrorism and counterterrorism.

5

Chapter I
Terrorism as a Global Issue
Introduction
Terrorism is presently one of the most significant issues facing America. Our
responses to terrorism are rooted in the way we understand or theorize terrorist actions.
The U.S. currently employs a deterrent approach to counterterrorism, which theorizes
terrorism at the individual level. From the deterrent perspective, terrorism is the result of
cost benefit calculations made by individual rational actors. In other words, the
assumption that people commit terrorism when the benefits of doing so outweigh the
costs or risks (rational choice) informs our counterterrorism strategy.
Counterterrorism policies based on deterrence employ methodological
individualism and therefore do not consider larger social, political and economic
contexts. This chapter begins to describe the global context in which terrorism takes place
through a world systems perspective. Additionally, this chapter addresses the political
process of democracy promotion, the globalization of culture and the impact of
globalization on collective grievances. Once the global context of terrorism is outlined, I
will provide a detailed critique of deterrence as counterterrorism strategy that is not
appreciative of the globalization processes described here.
World Systems Analysis 1
Terrorism, as a political response to cultural and political inequalities requires a
framework that incorporates the global context of terrorism. World systems analysis
1

I am purposely using world systems “analysis” rather than “theory”. In 1997, Wallerstein, possibly in
response to critiques of his theory (or lack thereof) by others such as Stinchcome (1982), claims that world
systems is a critical perspective of the world as well as a critique of other perspectives. It is to be
considered a stepping stone toward a theory.
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provides a global framework within which terrorism is understood as an international act
of collective political violence that may arise in response to collective grievances. If
terrorists operate outside nation state boundaries by employing a concept of sovereignty
that is essentially “post-national”, one that shares “the strategies of global corporations”
and employs the use of internet communication to facilitate networking and organization,
then our understanding of terrorism must be “post-national” as well (Buck-Morss
2007:5). One way to understand terrorism as a ‘post-national” phenomenon, is through
the lens of world systems analysis. Immanuel Wallerstein proposes a sociological
analysis of international relations within a capitalist framework. He suggests that we are
not isolated nation states, but are in a period in history where all nations are part of a
world economy-a world system that lacks a single, unified political system (Wallerstein
1976). Although there is no unifying political system, a world system does have a single
division of labor. The world economy is made up of three types of geographical areas:
core, periphery and semi-periphery.
The core areas are those that are economically and politically dominant within the
system. Core areas, of which the United States is one, produce technologically advanced
goods and incur the most benefit from trade with the semi-periphery and periphery. The
semi-periphery acts as a buffer between the core and the periphery. It exploits the
resources from the periphery, but with less benefit than the core and exploited by the core
simultaneously. Intensive economic processes occur in the peripheral areas using
coercive labor practices and resource extraction. Economic and labor exchange is made
between the three types of areas. However, the core absorbs most of the economic
rewards of the trade, while the periphery suffers the most loss economically and
7

ecologically. The unequal distribution of costs and rewards between the core and
periphery occurs within the process of development of the world system as well as its
maintenance. As the world economy expands and proliferates, the “disparity of rewards
between different sectors…as a whole may be simultaneously widening” (Wallerstein
1976:230).
The role of the nation state within a world system is to protect the capitalist class
goal of acquiring capital. Elites maintain influence over the state instrumentally; serving
in a political role themselves or using their power to influence state decisions and
structurally, because the state has to preserve the capitalist economy and that results in
benefiting the elite class. The interstate competition for capital in a world economy
requires the state to act in the best interest of the national elite class in order to remain
competitive (Shannon 1992).
Nation states have two types of power; despotic and infrastructural. Despotic
power is the ability to operate and make decisions without the influence of the members
of civil society. Infrastructural power refers to the state’s ability to create and implement
policies and exercise control in a manner that affects those in civil society (Mann 1986).
The most successful nation states or the most influential within the world economy are
those states that operate with a high level of infrastructural power (Shannon 1992). In
fact, since the end of WWII, the nation states’ first priority is to implement policies that
are meant to preserve social and political order while insuring the conditions necessary
for economic accumulation and expansion (Dahms 2005). Therefore, states are the source
of domestic and international policies that serve the interests of the capitalist class.
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The state system in the world system is sustained through the simultaneous
weakening of alternative organizational forms. For instance, the state gains legitimacy
through their claims to control the population, and territory. States also control the use
and means of violence. In other words, only states can give, sell, buy or trade weapons to
other states. Non-state actors are not permitted to obtain or use weapons. Further,
alternative organizing strategies such as religious or ethnic groups lose legitimacy as
states gain power and come to be viewed as reactionary groups. Terrorist organizations
are non-state actors who cannot legitimately obtain and use weapons, control the
population or territories (Meyer 1980). Therefore, even though terrorists are non-state
actors, they recognize the role of the state has having the infrastructural power to make
policy decisions and implement them. Attacking the state is a way of attacking the source
of policy.
Recent evidence supports Wallersteins’ claim that inequality between nations
exists and is increasing. Although evidence suggests that core - periphery relationships
result in income growth, most of the growth occurs within core countries. Further,
income growth disproportionately benefits those who are already in elite positions within
most nations (Shannon 1992). For instance, according to the 2006 Population Reference
Bureau, the gross national income (GNI) in purchasing power parity (PPP) for the United
States in 2005 was $41,950. 2 Comparable GNI’s to the United States were the United
Kingdom’s ($32,690), France ($30,540) and Canada ($32,220). Countries such as Syria

2

This indicates that each person in the U.S. has the purchasing power to spend $41,950 over a one year
period if every person held an equal amount of wealth.
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($3,740), Saudi Arabia ($14,740), Bangladesh ($2,090) and Iran ($8,050) have
significantly less purchasing power compared to Western nations 3 .
Similarly, wealth disparities exist within countries and regions. The 2004 Iraq
Living Conditions Survey concluded that the level of income inequality in Iraq is
relatively low compared to Jordan and Iran. However, the Gini coefficient on income
inequality increased from 35.1 in 2003 to 41.5 in 2004. Most households in Iraq rely on
food rations in addition to any available household income and household income varies
according to geographic locations within Iraq.
The Human Development Report also offers evidence that inequalities, not just in
wealth, but well-being are not decreasing despite efforts to develop the less developed
regions of the world. According to the Human Development Report, the wealthiest 500
people in the world have more income (excludes assets) than the other 416 million
people 4 . The report concludes that, “Wealth accumulation at the top of the global income
distribution has been more impressive than poverty reduction at the bottom” (HDR
2006:269). In addition to the PPP, the report also uses a composite measure of adult
literacy and enrollment as well as life expectancy to determine the level of human well
being in various states and regions. For instance, life expectancy at birth in Arab States is
67.3 years, Afghanistan is 46 years and Iraq is 58.8 years. Adult literacy rates, measured
as the percent of the population over the age of 15 who are literate include 69.9% for
Arab States, 28.1% for Afghanistan and 74.1% for Iraq.

3

GNI PPP are not currently available for countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Regionally, Western
Asia’s GNI is $7,500 and South Central Asia’s GNI is $3,330 compared to North America’s GNI of
$40,980.
4
The number in the 2006 HDR reflect statistics collected in 2004.
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The Arab Human Development Report (2002) offers information on the
developmental “progress” of the Arab region over the last 20 years. The report suggests
that literacy rates, education and life expectancy show improvement, but income growth
remains extremely low. In fact, as of 2003, the GDP per capita for Arab states was
$5,370. Moghaddam (2006:74) reports similar findings, “of the thirty-four less developed
countries that have significant oil and natural gas resources, up to half the population in
twelve of these countries live on less than $1 a day”. Therefore, a majority of people in
oil rich nations have not benefited from the generation of oil wealth. In fact, by 1998, the
real income for those living in Arab states fell to 13.9% of the real income of Western
nations. These figures suggest that strong core states are able to profit from the resource
extraction from peripheral areas. These profits are not restricted to core nations however
an international alliance of elite classes from various nations benefit from the extraction
and distribution of oil and natural gas. Therefore, the benefits of income growth are not
restricted to nation state boundaries, nor do they benefit all people equally.
The process of globalization that includes a world economy and produces unequal
costs and rewards may indirectly influence terrorism in two ways. First, as Wallerstein
points out, globalization weakens the role of individual nation states in the global
economy, although some nation states maintain a comparatively strong role within the
world economy in relation to peripheral and semi-peripheral states. Strong states are
those that are capable of implementing policies even in the face of international and
domestic objections. Strong states are able to pursue policies that support elite class
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interests regardless of internal or external protest 5 (Hopkins et al 1982). According to
Moghadam (2006) the lessening importance of the nation state, particularly in developing
areas, may threaten people’s identities to the point where people no longer identify
themselves along national lines, but identify themselves ethnically and/or religiously.
These shifting identities can lead to violence as a response to those who pose a threat to
traditional cultures.
Second, some argue that relative deprivation makes it possible for terrorist
organizations to recruit those who are not benefiting from the global economy. In
particular, terrorist groups such as Hezbollah provide welfare services to those who are in
need when the nation state cannot or does not. Therefore, Hezbollah is able to gain
support from the poorer populations (Moghadam 2006; Moghaddam 2006).
World systems theorists offer three explanations of the relationship between
globalization and anti-U.S. terrorism. The first model argues that anti-U.S. terrorism is
related to the hegemonic decline of the United States since the Cold War. They argue that
after the Cold War, the world went through a reordering of alliances and enemies within
the core as well as political and economic restructuring in semiperipheral areas. As the
role of the U.S. as a hegemonic core country changed, terrorism became both a catalyst
and a response to the changing roles of the core and semiperipheral nations within the
world economy (Bergesen and Lizardo 2005; Lizardo 2006).
Conversely, the “interstate dominance model” of terrorism rejects the idea that
terrorism has a relationship to the hegemonic decline of the United States. Instead,
Sobeck and Braithwaite (2005) suggest quite the opposite; terrorism increases as
5

The strength of the state power held by the U.S was demonstrated when the U.S. invaded Iraq without
U.N. approval and with no repercussions.
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hegemonic power increases. They argue that as hegemonic power increases, people begin
to concentrate on the effects of global hegemonic sources of foreign policy and away
from the comparably less powerful actors within the system. Therefore, international
actors begin to shift their objections and grievances away from smaller (usually more
local) political actors to the more powerful global hegemon. “Dominance from this point
of view leads to an increase in the impact of the hegemon’s foreign policy on a wider
geographical scale, which may lead to an increase in dissatisfaction with these policies
and a more proactive attempt to alter them” (Lizardo 2006:151). Sobeck and Braithwaite
(2005) found empirical support for their hypothesis that anti-U.S. terrorism increases
along with an increase in American dominance in the world system 6 .
Finally, Lizardo (2006) in an attempt to build upon the hegemonic rise and
decline models of anti-U.S. terrorism, which explain the factors that allow terrorism to
occur, suggests that economic globalization and cultural globalization can explain the
changes in frequency and intensity of terrorist incidents. Lizardo (2006:152) hypothesizes
that adding the influence of “world cultural models, recipes and schemas constitutive of
actors, goals and actions” to the global economic processes in order to contextualize
terrorism “provide(s) a meaningful context for the active expression of anti-hegemonic
expressions of grievances on the global stage”. He finds that the spread of cultural values
such as individuality, organization and social action mediate the effects of economic and

6

Sobeck and Braithwaite (2005) tested their time series model between 1968 and 1996.
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political globalization by providing frameworks of meaningful ways to engage in antihegemonic violent protest 7 .
Global market exchange also provides the conditions for the exchange of culture.
The globalization of Western values such as consumerism and individualism are often
seen as threatening to cultures that value community, shared resources and alternative
social structures (Moghadam 2006). Historically, when Europe came to hold a dominant
position within the world market, other cultures who employed traditional methods of
production (as opposed to industrial methods) and held “traditional” world views were
either absorbed or coerced into assimilating into the European model of production and
consumption. Although assimilation occurred to varying degrees in different geographic
areas, ethnic ties and traditional values weakened and sometimes severed completely.
Through the process of assimilation and absorption, the traditional world views that gave
meaning to people’s lives were replaced or impeded upon by the “spiritual emptiness of
modernism” (Shannon 1992:207).

Polyarchy
Moghaddam (2006) suggests that the global perspective of terrorism also needs to
take into account the spread or exportation of democracy. One of the goals of the War in
Iraq is the implementation of a secular democratic government. Further, the U.S. assumes
that a democratic government will act as a deterrent to future terrorist attacks (Monten

7

Wallerstein suggests that the attacks on 9/11 were the result of turning verbal assaults and complaints into
physical. Prior to 9/11, Americans could “afford” to ignore global complaints. Therefore, 9/11 became a
meaningful way of expressing that which was not being effectively communicated otherwise.
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2005). Therefore, a world systems perspective also calls for an examination of the present
and historical process of democracy promotion.
Within a world systems perspective, Robinson (1996) refers to the imposition of
political forms as democracy promotion or ‘polyarchy’. Democracy promotion is related
to power, the globalization of politics and economic relations within a global society.
Low intensity democracy, or polyarchy is a political system that is not restricted within
national borders, but operates within a global economy and is maintained by transnational
elites.
According to Robinson (1996:35), the international elite are currently promoting
neo-liberal economics and polyarchy throughout the world. The promotion of democracy,
or polyarchy, is the political pathway through which the U.S. is attempting to broaden
and deepen Iraq, Afghanistan’s and the Middle East’s involvement in the market
economy across the globe. Within the promotion of polyarchy and neo-liberalism, the
elite wish to create the conditions for the “complete mobility of capital”. Polyarchy is
made up of a minority of elites who are responsible for making decisions that affect the
entire society. The promotion of polyarchy protects elite interests and investments
because it does not allow for a true representative democracy to form (Robinson 1996).
The ideology behind polyarchy promotion, including outside support of authoritarian
regimes, is one that makes business operation and military accessibility a priority
(Herman 1983:44-45). For example, in 2006, Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
announced that the new Iraqi government would not be set up by the United Nations.
Rather, the U.S. would set up a interim regime. However, with the U.S. solely in charge
on creating a temporary government in Iraq; “by the time the Iraqi people have a say in
15

choosing a government, the key economic decisions about their country's future will have
been made by their occupiers” (Klein 2003:14).
Robinson (1996) suggests that international policy examinations be linked to the
social and political economy of states, as well as the “extended policy making community
which mediates the link between agency and structure in the development of policy”
(Robinson 1996:26-27). Therefore, the background and foreground of policies as well as
the extended policymaking community (corporations, think tanks and elected or
appointed officials) need to be considered in order to arrive at a more holistic picture of
policy development and practice.
The promotion of democracy, particularly within Islamic states, is viewed with
suspicion by those living in those areas. Moghaddam (2006) names three reasons why
democracy promotion by the U.S. is not viewed as legitimate. First, the terrorists (and
arguably others) do not believe that the U.S. wants to implement a form of true
democracy to others. Rather, the U.S. wants to promote a form of polyarchy where the
international elite, including the United States elites can operate some form of control
over the newly democratic nations. The assumption that the U.S. does not really want to
implement democracy comes from historical examples of U.S. efforts to stymie
democratic movements in other non-Western regions; Iran, Algeria, Venezuela, and
Egypt to name a few (Moghaddam 2006; Johnson 2000; Blum 2004).
Second, the U.S. appears to be interested in promoting democracies only when
those governments or elections result in pro-American governments. For example, Hugo
Chavez of Venezuela was popularly elected and anti-American. The U.S. sees him as a
major threat to U.S. political and economic interests, yet is status as a democratically
16

elected leader remains opposed by the U.S. government. In Iraq too, the U.S. was
involved in the manipulation of elections and the media in order to bring to power proAmerican Iyad Alawi (Moghaddam 2006) 8 .
Third, Islamic fundamentalists are opposed to U.S. polyarchy because a secular
form of government does not fit in with their traditional forms of religious government.
Democracy threatens to reshape how people relate to each other and would allow them to
create new social and political relationships and structures.
The use of democracy promotion by the U.S. is objected to by nations where the
U.S. is trying to manipulate elections. For instance, the “free elections” held in Dubai in
August 2007 are controversial because although the citizens voted in a democratic
election, they did not vote America’s choice into power. America’s ability to manipulate
elections by supporting a particular party appears to be weakening. This scenario is “the
paradox of American policy in the Middle East – promoting democracy on the
assumption it will bring countries closer to the West – is that almost everywhere there are
free elections, the American-backed side tends to lose” 9 (Fattah 2007). The paradox also
seems to be that other countries recognize that there is something anti-democratic about
U.S. support for one party, rather than U.S. support for all citizens. Further, citizens in
other nations believe that America’s involvement in elections emboldens internal
conflicts and makes the ruling elites defensive of their power positions, which makes
them less willing to make compromises. Therefore, Arab politicians are turning away

8

Moghaddam’s (2006) points one and two above are not only voiced by Islamic extremists or Iraqis.
Concerns over the promotion of democracy also come from other people globally including those in
Western Europe who typically act as American allies.
9
New York Times, “U.S. Backs Free Elections, Only to See Allies Lose”.
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from U.S. support for free elections and are relying on support from ethnic, religious and
tribal groups and powers (Fattah 2007).
Democracy also operates as an ideology. As the paradox of democracy described
above suggests, democracy promotion offers all people an equal say in how their political
decisions are made. In reality, the elite interests, including elites from the U.S. often have
more influence on the outcomes of decisions, economic structures and political alliances
than the general population. Yet, with at least the semblance of a democracy in place,
resistance against authority may be more difficult. The legitimating characteristic of
democracy may in fact reduce some articulations of opposition. Therefore, the purpose of
democracy promotion is aimed “not only at mitigating the social and political tensions
produced by elite-based and undemocratic status quos, but also at suppressing popular
and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization of social life” (Robinson
1996:6). The Iraqis have not only been denied their right to vote for a representative
without U.S. interference, but they are left out of the decision making process as far
economic decisions and reconstruction efforts.
“Entirely absent from this debate (the privatization of oil by
multinationals) are the Iraqi people, who might—who knows?—want to
hold on to a few of their assets. Iraq will be owed massive reparations
after the bombing stops, but without any real democratic process, what is
being planned is not reparations, reconstruction or rehabilitation. It is
robbery: mass theft disguised as charity; privatization without
representation” (Klein 2003:15).

If terrorism is in fact taking place internationally and within a globalized world,
than theories of terrorism need to place terrorism within a global context. The global
contextualization of terrorism allows us to explore the larger political, economic and
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cultural structures rather than focusing on individual actors. Terrorism needs to be
explored through a world-systems lens that illuminates the imposition of political,
economic and cultural structures. The following serves as a description of attempts to
place terrorism within a global perspective.
Terrorism in a Global Context
Terrorism may, in fact have less to do with individual characteristics and
decision-making than a deterrent policy suggests (Arena and Arrigo 2005). Rather,
researchers such as Moghaddam (2006) suggest that in order to explain and properly
address terrorism, he recommends that we attempt to take the “terrorists’ point of
view” 10 . Taking the perspective of terrorists is difficult because our current orientations
focus on individuals and small groups, rather than the larger picture that incorporates the
social contexts; the contexts that Moghaddam (2006) suggests create social inequalities.
First, the motivation of terrorists is difficult to comprehend because most people
cannot imagine taking their own lives, let alone taking the lives of others in the process of
a suicidal mission or other terrorist act. Because suicidal terrorism is beyond
comprehension to most people, we explain terrorist actions by assuming that they must be
insane, irrational or simply immoral. This assumption, however, restricts our capacity to
understand the terrorist phenomenon as something that requires a more comprehensive
worldview than focusing on rational/irrational, sane/insane individuals.
Taking the view of terrorists, Moghaddam (2006) suggests that terrorists are a)
rational and b) believe they act morally. They rationally implement plans to bring

10

Criminologists such as Jack Katz also suggest that taking the perspective of offenders rather than victims
offers special insight into the criminal event as well as the processes that lead to criminal acts.
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attention to their causes or concerns. They believe they are acting morally in response to
the immoral actions of others. For instance, the attacks on September 11th were rationally
planned attacks aimed at the United States geographically as well as its citizens 11 .
Terrorists consider citizens of the U.S responsible, at least in part for the U.S. policies
that affect international relations. In particular, the voting public is responsible for
electing representatives who create and implement policies that affect the lives of
hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq and the Middle East (Moghaddam 2006).
Therefore, the citizens become the logical target of terrorist attacks physically and
psychologically. Further, terrorists are employing a method that “legitimate” states use as
an international policy, overtly or covertly: violence. Terrorists are using violent
methods, just as nation states invoke the use of violence when deemed necessary.
If terrorists do indeed take such a perspective, then a limited view of terrorism
through a deterrence lens will not illuminate the political context described above. In
order to gain a better understanding of the social (political, economic) context of
terrorism, we must first expand our perspective beyond the context of rational actors and
even beyond groups or nation states. We need to view terrorism from a world system
perspective. If the terrorists do not see themselves as limited to geographic territorial
boundaries, but rather employ transnational violent tactics to express political and
cultural grievances, a world system’s perspective provides an appropriate framework for
illuminating the global context. World systems, therefore, provides a theoretical entry
into the political violence of non-state actors.

11

It is important to note that many people from around the world lost their lives on September 11th, and not
just Americans.

20

Moghaddam’s (2006) vision of terrorism as rational moral action encourages us to
view terrorism as a political action. In particular, terrorism is political action employed
by those with fewer resources than an established nation state. Whereas established,
sovereign nation states have the military means and sovereign right to employ violence in
the name of the collective, terrorist organizations have fewer resources. Further, state
violence in the name of a collective is legitimate warfare; terrorism is political action by
other means (Buck Morss 2007). Moghadam (2006) refers to use of violence by non-state
actors as “asymmetric warfare” waged in the name of a collective against a sovereign
nation through whatever means are available. Examples of non-state collectivities that
employ or have employed political violence include the Irish Republican Army,
Hezbollah and Hamas. However, the discourses involved in deterrence as a
counterterrorism strategy dismisses terrorism as a political strategy by claiming that
terrorists are illegitimate, non-state actors. Such discourses reduce terrorists to individual
actors with radical goals that threaten the legitimacy of ‘real states’ rather than viewing
terrorism as a collective political action.
Identity Crisis and Terrorism
Moghaddam (2006) describes a process in which Islamic terrorists find
themselves attracted to terrorism and terrorist organizations as way of engaging in
effective social action. He describes this process as a staircase that individuals climb as
they attempt to respond to social conditions and crisis. First, people in areas that are
experiencing extreme inequality, little political influence and cultural transformations
begin to search for a way to improve their living conditions. Expressing dissatisfaction
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becomes increasingly difficult and frustrating when there are few resources available, and
those resources are monopolized by an elite minority. The democratic processes that are
supposed to offer all individuals an equal opportunity to vote and participate in the free
market, are not operating in a manner that allows all people to feel included or effective
politically. The inability to create change and take control over one’s own life increases
frustration, anger, shame and hostility. In many Muslim countries, opposition and critique
to political, economic and social conditions are not tolerated and are relegated to the
mosque. Therefore, religion becomes one way in which to mobilize against perceived
injustices.
The direction Muslims would like to take their societies is highly splintered
internally, which adds to the already tumultuous conditions economically, politically and
culturally. Disagreements on the path society should take to achieve true Islam leads to
conflict between Islamic groups. For instance, there are contradictory opinions as to the
role and rights of women, some factions would like to see a return to what they call “pure
Islam”, and others advocate creating societies that are copies of the West. Some
individuals and groups therefore, become motivated to seek out effective ways of change
through different “religious, nationalist, ethnic and personal causes” (Moghaddam
2006:58).
Next, the grievances of those living in Muslim societies, particularly those lead by
dictators and supported by the U.S., are directed toward the U.S. and away from the local
leadership. Moghaddam’s (2006) suggestion that individuals begin to place the source of
their grievance with U.S. policy supports the “interstate dominance model” of terrorism
(Sobeck and Braithwaite 2005). However, Moghaddam (2006) goes so far as to suggest
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that dictators and powerful elites within Muslim nations play a role in aiming
dissatisfaction toward the West and as a distraction from grievances aimed at internal
elites.
The recognition of the West as a source of globalization and responses to it are
shaped by various ideologies. According to Snow and Byrd (2007) terrorists and terrorist
organizations use various discursive methods to frame the globalization problem, offer
the means to alleviate the problem and motivate individuals to take action. First,
diagnostic framing identifies a social problem that is in need of rectification and assigns
blame or responsibility for that grievance. Similarly, Arena and Arrigo (2005:501) find
that the identification of a grievance “casts members of a particular ethnic, racial,
religious or political affiliation into a perceived threatened position” that requires a
response.
The rhetoric involved in the identification and construction of a grievance
contributes to a victim identity; one that embodies an extreme sense of persecution. For
instance, Islamic fundamentalist believe that the infiltration of Western culture and values
is a threat to their way of life. They loathe the materialism, not only of the West, but their
own elites. The answer to this problem, according to militant leaders, is to stimulate a
cohesive identity and strongly embracing the values of Islam.
Of course, the West is not described as the most important source of grievances
within all diagnostic frames. For instance, Palestinian movements, the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan and Hezbollah are focused on nationalism (Snow and Byrd 2007). What is
important to note, is that the identification of a social problem and the expression of the
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necessity to change the problem is “a necessary condition for targeted collective action”
(Snow and Byrd 2007).
Prognostic framing is equally as important for the implementation of collective
action as the diagnosis. Prognostic framing offers more specific paths of action to
alleviate the social problem that has been diagnosed. For example, a 2005 letter from alZawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s advisor, to the self proclaimed leader of al Qaeda in Iraq
al-Zarqawi states,
The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage:
Establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it
until it achieves a level of caliphate. The third stage: Extend the jihad
wave to secular countries neighboring Iraq 12 ….

In order for people to take violent collective action, they must also adhere to
motivational framing processes. Motivational processes provide not only the rationale for
action, but also the alleviation of fear or risk. Osama bin Laden called on Muslims to take
action against American and its allies as part of his 1998 fatwa when he declared that it
was the religious duty of all Muslims to use violence against the aggressors (Snow and
Byrd 2007). Similarly, if individuals and groups accept the diagnosis and prognosis
framing and define the situation as one that requires action, inaction becomes immoral
and unacceptable (Arena and Arrigo 2005).
Religious ideology as motivational framing is also important in regards to suicide
bomber because suicide is sacrilegious to the Muslim faith. However, the promise of
martyrdom and the call to fulfill a moral obligation alleviate fear and rationalize the risk
involved in carrying out such a task. Further, potential terrorists may draw “upon
12

Quoted in Snow and Byrd (2007:128)
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components of the victim-oriented position that defines the person’s oppressed status,
role taking here means that some sort of violent response is warranted (even necessary
and just): one that is intended to reclaim what has been lost or otherwise endangered”
(Arena and Arrigo 2005:501). The martial role, or the move towards violent action, is
fully embraced when the terrorist act is committed. In other words, when the potential
terrorist becomes an actual terrorist, they are living out their martial identities in an
attempt to influence society.
Conclusion
This chapter outlined the complex problem of terrorism within a global context.
First, globalization requires us to think about terrorism on a global level, rather than
strictly an individual level. Second, economic globalization and democracy promotion
create global inequities in terms of material resources and political power. Third, cultural
globalization threatens traditional ways of life through absorption and assimilation. These
global processes have real consequences on the individuals living in these societies.
However, as we will see in the next chapter, rational choice theories of terrorism do not
encourage the incorporation of these globalization processes into analysis of terrorism
and the development of counterterrorism policies.
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Chapter II
Deterring Terrorism
Introduction
The previous chapter addressed the global context in which terrorism takes place.
In this chapter, I will introduce and critique U.S. counterterrorism strategy and its basis in
rational choice theory. Despite the global context described in the previous chapter, in
many ways one can look at counterterrorism strategy as a perspective that fails to take
that context into account. Counterterrorism policy is based on deterrence, or the idea that
terrorism can be prevented by increasing the costs and reducing the benefits of engaging
in terrorist behavior. Deterrence, as a way to influence behavior is based on the idea of
rational choice. Historically, rational choice theories of human behavior were based in
neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economic theories of rational choice are critiqued
based on methodological flaws. Specifically, rational choice is based on methodological
individualism and instrumentalism. Human behavior is assumed to be the result of
rational cost-benefit analysis that is divorced from the social conditions of the actor.
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that requires a multifaceted understanding.
However, the assumption that people engage in terrorism because it appears more
rewarding than alternative behaviors does not allow for a more detailed exploration of
where motivation comes from, or why some people commit terrorism.
I will begin this chapter by explaining neoclassical economic rational choice
theory as it relates to rational choice theory in criminology, deterrence and routine
activities theory. Next, I will critique rational choice for its methodological flaws and
assumptions of motivation. From this critique of assumed motivation, I demonstrate why
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understanding motivation is crucial to understanding terrorism; structural inquiry into
motivation provides a link between structure (neglected by deterrence approaches) and
action. Finally, I give some examples of social scientists who are proposing alternative
approaches to understanding terrorism that begin to move beyond strictly deterrence
based, utilitarian rational actor models.
Neoclassical Economics and Rational Choice
Neoclassical economic theories contain three axioms. Neoclassicism is based on
a) methodological individualism, b) methodological instrumentalism and c)
methodological equilibrium. Neoclassical economic theories assume that people have
identifiable rational preferences; they seek to maximize their utility and people act
according to available information. Deterrence theories (rational choice) is based on
neoclassical economic theories, specifically neo-classical economic theories that are now
being used to explain non-economic spheres of social life and shape our perspectives on
issues such as crime and terrorism.
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) identify two problems that are components of
all of neoclassical theories. First, neoclassicism is problematic because it fails to elucidate
economic reality, and therefore, its extension to explaining social reality is problematic as
well. Second, despite the methodological flaws of rational choice theory, neoclassicism is
successful because of its discursive value, but that value is driven politically within
economic research and prevents the possibility of alternative theories becoming
dominant 13 .

13

See discussion of intellectual hegemony in Gramsci (1971) and Thompson (1997).
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Methodological individualism is problematic because it divorces the agent from
her structure by theorizing action at the individual level only. When structure is
considered, it is analyzed from the relationship of the agent’s influence on structure. The
“explanatory trajectory remains one that begins with the agent and maps unidirectionally
onto structure” despite the recognition that the agent is a “creature” of her social context
(Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2006:4).
Equally problematic is neoclassical economists’ use of methodological
instrumentalism. Methodological instrumentalism is based on the assumption that all
human behavior is driven by preferences or an effort to maximize preference satisfaction.
Some economic theories, such as game theory, have branched out to include the effect of
structure and historical interaction on an agent’s preferences. However, these theories
continue to adhere to means-ends instrumentalism (Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2006).
Lastly, neoclassical economics is based on methodological equilibration.
Equilibration fills a gap between micro explanatory methods (individualism and
instrumentalism) and the macro level, which allows prediction at the social or extraindividual level. “Thus, neoclassical theoretical exercises begin by postulating the agents’
utility functions, specifying their constraints, and stating their ‘information’ or
belief’”(Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2006:4). Methodological equilibration, then, is based
on the question of what behavior should be expected given equilibrium. However, the
existence of equilibrium is taken as a given i.e. the possibility, probability or how
equilibrium “materializes” is not part of the explanatory project (Thompson 1997).
Equilibrium is the assumption that “agents’ beliefs are systematically and consistently
aligned” (Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2006:5). Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006:4) name
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three steps in the process of methodological equilibration: a) someone finds a system of
equilibrium, b) the theorist assumes that “agents (or their behavior) will find themselves
in equilibrium and c) once at that equilibrium, any changes in the system will still fail to
change individuals from pursuing their self interest. Equilibrium is based on timelessness
and certainty. The timelessness of equilibrium, the assumption of rational time or a time
span in which whatever needs to happen will ultimately occur, allows for the universal
applicability of economic theory (Thompson 1997).
Neoclassical economics is also problematic because this theory and methodology
are now being applied to understand other, non-economic spheres of social life. In his
lecture for the acceptance of the Nobel Prize, Gary S. Becker (1992) summarized the
various areas in which he believes the economic approach is a proper method of analysis
for understanding social life. In particular, he discusses economic research on
discrimination, crime and punishment, human capital and the family. For instance, he
claims that in human capital theory, “people rationally evaluate the benefits and costs of
activities such as education, training, expenditures on health, migration and formations of
habits that radically alter the way they are” (Becker 1992:402). Similar analyses are made
about the family. The decisions concerning marriage, divorce, and children are
determined by a cost-benefit ratio of the advantages and disadvantages of each action to
an alternative action. The application of neoclassical economic theories to various realms
of social life reduces human action to market analyses 14 . Rational choice theory in
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Economists such as Hirshleifer (1985) describes the initial success that economics has enjoyed when it is
employed to understand various realms of social life , but also admits that within these realms doubts have
emerged that still need to be addressed. For instance, economists have still not answered the question of
why, when given the same opportunities and constraints, some people engage in crime, while others obey
the law.
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economics and its subsequent development in criminology is an example of the extension
of economic theories to explain other human behaviors.
Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice theory, an analytical tool to explain and understand individual
behaviors and decisions, claims individuals engage in behaviors after calculating the
perceived costs and benefits of that action. Rational choice theory developed out of
utilitarian philosophies of the eighteenth century as well as the “expected utility”
principal in economics. Put simply, the expected utility principle suggests that people will
engage in those activities that they predict will produce the greatest returns or rewards
while simultaneously reducing the costs. According to rational choice applications to
criminology, crime occurs when the perceived benefits (thrill, money, respect) of
engaging in illegal activities outweigh the perceived costs or risks (capture, punishment)
of those activities (Becker 1968). The decision to commit a crime is therefore based on
the probability and severity of possible benefits of crime versus the probability and
severity of punishment. Likewise, crime may be prevented by altering the probable costto-benefit ratio so that it exceeds unity (Bentham 1948). Deterrence is the practice of
altering the cost-benefit ratio through the use of formal sanctions in order to prevent
crime.
Deterrence is rooted in rational choice thought and states that “swift, certain and
severe sanctions for criminal acts reduce crime” (Akers and Sellers 2004:30). The
swiftness, certainty and severity of punishment increase the costs or risks of engaging in
illegal activity. Although Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1781) advocated the need for the
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swiftness, celerity and severity of punishment, research demonstrates that the certainty of
punishment is the most important element for deterrence purposes where certainty is the
likelihood of detection, apprehension and punishment. Further, deterrence can be general
or specific. Whereas general deterrence refers to the punishment of an offender as an
exemplar to deter others, specific deterrence refers to the punishment of an offender to
deter that particular individual from repeating the law violation (Zimring and Hawkins
1973).
Since rational choice theories stipulate that crime can be reduced through
increasing the risks for criminals, the theory also serves as a theory of punishment that
can then inform policy. For example, Becker (1993) claims that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission explicitly employs deterrence and rational choice in their development of
sentencing rules. The economic approach to crime and crime prevention has become
commonplace.
Similar to the popularity of rational choice and deterrence in crime analyses,
economists are also employing rational choice models to understand terrorism and inform
counterterrorism deterrence policy. Historically, deterrence was employed as part of the
Cold War strategy and other international relations policies. Today, a vast amount of
research exists on terrorism advocating the use of various forms of deterrence to prevent
terrorist attacks (Frey and Luechinger 2002, Davis 2002, Caplan 2005, Enders and
Sandler 2006, Das and Lahiri 2006). For instance, Davis (2002), in his study of how to
best deter terrorists, concludes that general deterrence against terrorism is not likely to be
effective. Further, the severe actions that would be necessary to produce a favorable
deterrent effect would violate American values, even the rules of war. Therefore, he
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suggests that more specific deterrence should be employed in order to prevent particular
terrorist actions in light of the empirical research that suggests terrorists do not like
operational risks. Further, terrorist supporters are more easily deterred than the leaders of
organizations. As a result, he concludes that deterrence efforts may need to focus on
supporters rather then dismantling the entire terrorist network.
Similarly, Davis (2002) states that it may not be possible to deter al Qaeda, but
the manner in which the U.S. responds to al Qaeda may serve as a deterrent for other
organizations. In the case of terrorism through the acquisition and use of weapons of
mass destruction, Davis recommends that the U.S.
draw a line and credibly announce that anyone crossing that line by
possessing or supporting the acquisition of WMD for terrorists purposes
will be pursued relentlessly-forever if necessary-with all the means
necessary and with the United States willing to lower its standards of
evidence, presumed guilt, violate sovereignty, attack preemptively, and so
on (Davis 2002:60).

Finally, he recommends that since al Qaeda has already violated the rule against WMD’s,
deterrence is no longer an option in fighting al Qaeda specifically. Instead, we need to
use our response to al Qaeda as a deterrent against other terrorist organizations and plots.
In other words, the U.S. response to al Qaeda may not directly deter al Qaeda since they
have already attacked various targets. However, the U.S. response to the attacks will
serve as a general deterrent to other terrorist organizations.
The United States’ doctrine of deterrence in international relations is not a new
phenomenon. Historically, deterrence was used during the Cold War to prevent the Soviet
Union from engaging in a nuclear attack against the United States and against Saddam
Hussein just prior to Desert Storm. It was in response to the nuclear arms race,
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that the ideas first began to emerge —intellectually, brick by brick—that
in a world of perpetual vulnerability against such potential catastrophe, the
best one might be able to hope for is to find ways that could restrain any
nation state from ever again contemplating deliberate and major war.
Thus, the idea of deterrence of aggression emerged slowly, as a “derived
truth” rather than from any thesis, writings, or doctrine (Robinson 2004:2).
Both historical scenarios involved threats by the United States that if weapons of
mass destruction were used, the aggressors would be met with a devastating response
against both leaders and civilians. The ultimate goal was to instill fear in the adversary
that forces them to make calculations according to their self preservation. For instance, in
order to be effective, the adversary must fear failing his goals. Further, the adversary
must: “fear that his losses and pain will far outweigh any potential gains, fear that he will
be punished. It should ultimately create the fear of extinction—extinction of either the
adversary’s leaders themselves or their national independence, or both” (Robinson
2004:5).
Similar deterrence measures are applicable today. According to Robinson (2004),
deterrence is a “dynamic process” that requires constant reflection, understanding and
adjustment according to the threat. Therefore, Robinson reflecting on the use of
deterrence during the Cold War suggests that although we cannot prove that deterrence
was effective, it does appear to have ‘worked’ in the Soviet case (i.e the U.S. was not the
victim of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union). Although it is not accurately predictable
whether or not deterrence will be effective against other international threats such as
terrorism, he recommends evaluating past deterrence policies in order to understand what
might work in the war on terror.
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Today, we see deterrence employed as a counterterrorism strategy. Similar to
rational choice theories of crime, rational choice models of terrorism posit that terrorism
can be reduced by increasing the costs of participating in terrorist activities thus making
terrorist acts less attractive. To increase perceived costs, opportunity costs or material
costs, threats are used to produce what economists refer to as a negative sum game (Frey
and Luechinger 2002:237-239). In other words, if the potential terrorist sees a potential
loss if they participate in terrorist actions, they will choose alternative, non-terrorist
behaviors. Deterrence policies claim to “raise the cost of terrorist acts by increasing the
risk of apprehension and by punishing the perpetrators more severely…it (deterrence
efforts) also seeks to prevent terrorist acts by making them more difficult to undertake” 15
(Frey and Luechinger 2003:239).
Anti-Terrorism Discourse and Efforts
Terrorism is presently the focus of discussion among politicians, the media, and
academics. Much of what politicians argue, the media reports, and academics conclude
regarding terrorism deals with deterring further attacks on the United States and its allies.
For instance, the 9/11 Commission recommended a three part strategy for addressing the
terrorism problem: “attack terrorists and their organizations, prevent the growth of
terrorism, protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks” (9/11 Commission:363).
Deterrence against terrorism is important according to the 9/11 Commission.
They report that “defenses (also) complicate the plans of attackers, increasing their risk of
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Routine activities theory (RAT) is a criminological theory that is related to deterrence. RAT posits that
crime can be reduced through guardianship, the removal of motivated offenders and decreasing the
attractiveness of suitable targets of victimization (Cohen and Felson 1979). Therefore, RAT also promotes
deterrence measures in order to increase the perceived costs of engaging in illegal activities.
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discovery and failure” (364). Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was concerned
about use of short term rather than long term defense efforts and asked his advisors,

“Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are
recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion
a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is
putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a
great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is
against us” (9/11 Commission Report 2004:374-375 Italics added).

Deterrence and capture are achieved through the commission’s recommendation
that attractive terrorist targets be made less attractive and vulnerable to attack through
escalating the presence of security in order to increase the likelihood of capture (9/11
Commission Report 2004:383).
President Bush immediately began to concentrate on efforts to deter future attacks
on the US after September 11th 2001. That same month, he addressed Congress and the
world, describing the first steps in responding to the terrorist attacks. The various steps
included overhauling and increasing security at the nation’s airports including increasing
the number of air marshals, increasing the tools available to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, mobilizing and deploying US troops to Afghanistan and the Middle
East as well as the creation of the Office of Homeland Security (Bush 2001).
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism also emphasizes deterrence
measures to prevent attacks through various avenues. The fight against terrorism
“involves the application of all instruments of national power and influence to kill or
capture terrorists…prevent them from gaining access to WMD; render potential targets
less attractive by strengthening security; and cut off their sources of funding…”(NSCT
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2006:12). Target hardening, or decreasing the attractiveness of a potential target has
been successful thus far. Terrorists are not aiming to destroy hardened targets such as
national buildings. However, terrorists are now targeting potential soft target areas such
as schools, churches and areas of public transportation that are not as strongly protected
(NSCT 2006). Therefore the effectiveness of protecting attractive targets is not clear.
Scholars also recommend deterrence measures for combating terrorism. Caplan
(2005) in response to the assumed irrationality of terrorists suggests that although
terrorists may violate the rationality of homo economicus, using a deterrence approach is
still a viable option to reduce terrorism. He suggests increasing the likelihood and
severity of punishment as a suitable way to address terrorism. Others recommend
increasing the costs or risks of committing terrorism along with decreasing the benefits of
terrorist acts as a way to decrease the likelihood of an attack through various methods
(Das and Lahiri 2006; LaFree 2006; Fisher 2007). For instance, Fisher (2007) claims that
in order to effectively deter terrorists, particularly terrorist organizations, the United
States would have to use harsh measures that include regime change, nuclear retaliation,
and the targeted killings of terrorists and their family members. Other suggestions include
decreasing the benefits of terrorism by threatening to intercept monetary benefits such as
those paid to families for their sacrifice and increasing the costs of terrorism by
threatening imprisonment, execution and dishonor (Davis 2002). Further, the risks of
engaging in terrorism are increased through target hardening strategies and increasing the
guardianship of both geographic and personal targets of attack. Finally, others suggest
that the only way to prevent future terrorist attacks may be to act proactively, to kill or
capture terrorists before they actually commit terrorism (Caplan 2005).
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These writings make it clear that deterrence is the theoretical basis for addressing
the terrorist threat. Deterrence measures-,increasing the risks of engaging in terrorism
such as financial interception, security at airports and around our borders; military
presence and preemptive strikes- are all informed in some degree by the assumption that
terrorists make cost benefit calculations.
Deterrence in a Post Cold War World
Deterrence as an international policy, rather than strictly an economic or criminal
justice policy developed historically with various international threats to stability. The
conditions of the Cold War, for instance, allowed for the proliferation of deterrence
theories. Cold War deterrence was based on fear, retaliation and punishment. Effective
deterrence was based on three conditions: a) the adversarial person or state was
identifiable, b) that person or state had “highly valued assets” that could be attacked in
order to influence their decisions, and c) the possession of the means to deter by
threatening what the adversary values (Nurick 2003).
Deterrence theories justified specific policies in order to prevent nuclear attack.
For instance, deterrence theories allowed for the development of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) strategies as well as warfighting. Although both of these approaches
stem from deterrence, neither is empirically verifiable, “thus completely textual,
dependent upon arguing in an inferential fashion from data to claim” (Dauber 1993:4).
Mutual Assured Destruction required the U.S. to limit the use of its arms to deter
attack from outsiders and is based on the idea that outsiders will not attack when they
know that the U.S. can absorb an attack, and then retaliate with greater force. War37

fighting on the other hand, assumed that nuclear weapons could be used to deter a
broader range of Soviet activities. Regardless of the feasibility of engaging in a nuclear
war, the U.S. had to convince the Soviets that the U.S. not only believed that war was
possible, but that the U.S. would prevail.
Mutual Assured Destruction and warfighting are based on three stated
assumptions that are taken as truth and go unquestioned. First, deterrence theorists
believe that peace is preferable to war. Second, in order to avoid war, the U.S needed to
influence the Soviets without provoking them. “The assumption was …that American
and Soviet interests were so inimical that if the Soviets were to pursue their interests
without interference, competition and ultimately provocation, would have been
inevitable” (Dauber 1993:7). Third, reasoning with the Soviets would be ineffective. The
U.S. had to threaten the Soviets, not talk with them, while retaining freedom to pursue
global goals. The threats had to be perceived as real, based on mutual distrust and create
persuasion in order to deter nuclear attacks.
Even though the Cold War is over, deterrence approaches remain the primary
method for dealing with international threats. The Cold War strategy was a strategy of
nuclear deterrence. With the end of the Cold War, deterrence remains because nothing
new has been developed to take its place despite critiques of previous deterrence
methods. Dauber (1993) claims that after the Cold War, the U.S. was no longer distracted
by the Soviet and threat and was able to focus on other domestic and international issues.
Dauber (1993) believes this pattern of adhering to deterrence will continue “informing
debate and ultimately policy” into the future (Dauber 1993:158).
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Ambassador Robinson (2004) suggests that although the world has changed
since the Cold War, because deterrence has apparently been effective in the past (Cold
War, Hitler and Saddam Hussein in the 1990’s) it will remain a useful starting point for
developing and implementing nuclear strategies and counterterrorist policies in the
future. He states, “we should consider the history of the United States/Soviet nuclear
deterrence as a prototype – almost the ‘textbook’ solution – and proceed to take up the
problems of the emerging multilateral world” (Robinson 2004). In particular, the U.S.
maintains the Cold War strategy in confronting Islamic terrorism. In light of the attacks
on September 11th, and the perceived threat of fundamentalist Islam, the U.S. is
reproducing “the Cold War paradigm of mutually hostile blocs and ideologies, thus
perpetuating familiar modes of U.S. intervention in the Third World that rely on high
levels of militarization (Niva 1998).
We are currently experiencing the consequences of our continued adherence to
the deterrence doctrine, particularly concerning the Bush Administration and its approach
to terrorism. Here, I will give evidence that said theories inform our contemporary
counterterrorism efforts.
The enactment of the USA PATRIOT ACT gave unprecedented power to the
executive branch of the government as well as the various security agencies including the
newly formed Office of Homeland Security. Some of these powers, such as secret wire
tappings, threaten basic civil liberties and continue to be hotly debated. The formation
and use of prisons such as Abu Ghraib and Guantanomo Bay, Cuba are controversial for
various reasons; torture practices, the denial of habeas corpus and the secrecy of prison
policies to name a few.
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Despite the controversial PATRIOT ACT, the government’s response to 9/11
was the focus of the 2004 election and was particularly important for incumbents who
wanted to maintain political clout. Economically, the costs of implementing deterrence
strategies have far outweighed the monetary loss incurred from 9/11. The annual cost of
employing airline security screeners, air marshals and the increasingly sophisticated
screening technology exceeds 5 billion dollars. Simultaneously, the existence and
survival of entire industries and corporations are based on the ‘War on Terror’.
Adherence to deterrence in a post Cold War world does not allow for reflexive
theory building in regards to terrorism and creates policies that do not actually address
that which they claim to address 16 . The perpetuation of structures such as deterrence
beyond the end of the Cold War is referred to as Cold War “sedimentation” (Dahms
2006). Sedimentation occurs when “in the absence of a definite break with the political
and economic patterns that took hold during the Cold War, the latter…remain(s) as a
central feature and organizing principle, continuing to define the perimeter of choices we
perceive, the nature of the goals we pursue, and the types of means we both employ and
deploy” (Dahms 2006:xiii). If deterrence is one of the residual paradigms from the Cold
War era, its applicability to terrorism is questionable at best. Therefore, while the U.S.
continues to try and create and refine deterrence policies, we are failing to gain a proper
understanding of the social world in which terrorism arises and proliferates. The specific
economic and political consequences of the problematic nature of the deterrence
paradigm as a counterterrorism strategy will be the focus of the Chapter Three.

16

In fact, most critiques of deterrence, even Cold War deterrence, offer alternatives that are based on
rational choice, cost-benefit analysis and self interest.
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Here, I will demonstrate how methodological issues of individualism and
instrumentalism are related to the problematic relationship of structure and agency.
Methodological individualism eliminates structural influence from the terrorism equation,
making terrorism strictly a decision making process within the individual agent in stasis.
In particular, I will address the lack of interest researchers of terrorism have in the
motivational aspect of terrorism. The lack of interest in motivation is due to implicit and
explicit assumptions about the role of motivation in rational choice and routine activities
theories. I focus on deconstructing rational choice theories in light of the lack of interest
in the motivational aspect of terrorism despite the fact that motivation is recognized as
part of some theoretical models either implicitly or explicitly. I suggest that the
relationship between structure and agency is a more appropriate framework for
addressing terrorism with motivation acting as a bridge between structure and agency,
why terrorism occurs and how to respond to it.
Assumptions of Human Motivation
As stated previously, deterrence as a counterterrorism strategy is based on rational
choice and routine activities theories. Rational choice theory posits that people make cost
benefit calculations to make decisions that guide their behavior. Classical criminology
also assumes that humans make decisions “based on the extent to which they expect the
choice to maximize their profits or benefits and minimize the costs or losses” as the basis
of human nature in general (Akers and Sellers 2004:26). According to this theory, the
motivation of the actor is implicitly assumed to be self preservation or pleasure
maximization. In other words, human behavior is motivated by a desire to maximize
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pleasure or avoid pain. In particular, rational choice theory implicitly assumes that human
motivation stems from market based cost benefit analysis to maximize utility. For
example, Fisher (2007) suggests that one of the motivations for suicide bombers is the
monetary reward, an estimated 12,000 – 15,000 dollars, that will be given to the
bomber’s family once the mission is completed 17 . Therefore, he suggests that an effective
deterrent strategy against suicide bombers would be to threaten to punish the family
members of the bomber through various avenues including “targeting either the lives or
livelihood of these family members” (Fisher 2007:12). Fisher (2007) contends that the
threat of punishment for the family of the martyr may sufficiently deter suicide bombings
because it reduces the benefit of taking violent action.
The assumptions about the motivations of humans, offenders and terrorists are
problematic in their implications for work that follows this paradigm. Researchers fail to
incorporate more dynamic explanations of motivation into rational choice theories
because they rely on the previously assumptions of individual level cost benefit analyses.
This failure to incorporate and explore motivation is detrimental to our understanding of
terrorism as well as our responses to terrorists. What follows is a more detailed
explanation of how motivation is related to issues of methodological instrumentalism and
individualism, and how that is pertinent to the relationship of agency to structure.

The Role of Motivation
Where does motivation come from? It should tell us about why people engage in
particular behaviors. Taking motivation as a given factor rather than something that
17

Fisher (2007:12) estimates that the families of suicide bombers receive between $12,000 and $15,000.
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should be explored is problematic because understanding motivations allows us to also
understand the relationship between larger structural social forces, collective grievances
and action. An effort to understand why people engage in terrorism requires investigators
to explore the larger political, economic, cultural and global context in which it is
situated. Seeking an explanation of terrorism from a motivational point of view requires a
movement away from strictly utilitarian interpretations of terrorist actions.
Motivation is an important component of understanding particular actions such as
terrorism. Rational choice and routine activities theories operate under the assumption
that terrorists are rational actors 18 that engage in cost benefit analyses before engaging in
terrorist actions. The rationality of terrorists is debated despite the assumption by
deterrence models that terrorists are rational actors (Moghaddam 2006). Psychologists
argue that the belief that terrorists are “mentally deranged” people is incorrect. After
reviewing the psychological literature on the subject of terrorism, Charles Ruby
(2002:15) concludes that “terrorism is basically another form of politically motivated
violence that is perpetrated by rational, lucid people who have valid motives” (italics
added). Deterrence models assume that the actor has a specific goal they wish to achieve
through terrorist acts. In particular, the goals of terrorists are assumed to be to create fear
for political purposes, or to defend and maintain the status quo. However, theorists such
as Giddens (2002) argue that when we are trying to understand an actor’s intent or
rationale, we separate the action from its larger social context. Examining terrorism
through a deterrence lens does not allow for terrorism to be placed within a larger social
framework; it ignores the totality of the relationship between social structure and
18

Rationality is also based on utilitarianism or homo economicus. However, people can also act
altruistically.
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individual by focusing strictly on the actor. Therefore, “a theory of motivation is crucial
because it supplies the conceptual links between the rationalization of action and the
framework of convention as embodied in institutions” (Giddens 2002:235). Theorizing
motivation can help us move beyond the assumption that all action is a cost benefit
calculation by linking action to structural institutions that shape our choices.
Motivation and Terrorism
Addressing the issue of nuclear proliferation by non-state actors, Bonnie Jenkins
(2006) recommends that understanding the motivations of terrorists is crucial to
preventing their acquisition of nuclear weapons. She extends her argument that
nonproliferation efforts that address state motivations can and should be extended to nonstate actors given its success in the realm of the state nonproliferation. Whereas
deterrence efforts in the form of sanctions and export controls may be effective against
states, these efforts are not as effective against non-state actors 19 . Jenkins (2006)
suggests that, in addition to securing nuclear facilities and deterring states from aiding
terrorist organizations, a crucial component of preventing the terrorist acquisition of
nuclear weapons is to understand and address terrorist motivations. For instance, she
claims that most terrorist organizations are not secretive about their motivations or
grievances, whether they are political, religious or otherwise. In fact, Osama bin Laden
has stated publicly what his grievances are and why he initiated attacks such as the one

19

Jenkins (2006) claims that sanctions and other deterrence efforts may still be effective against states that
support non-state terrorist actors. Therefore, states will not aide terrorist organizations in their quest to
obtain to nuclear weapons, but will help deter the non-state actors for fear of international backlash. This is
a kind of indirect deterrence.
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on the Twin Towers. In a videotape aired on the Aljazeera network in 2004 bin Laden
states:
I say to you, Allah knows that it had never occurred to us to strike the
towers. But after it became unbearable and we witnessed the oppression
and tyranny of the American/Israeli coalition against our people in
Palestine and Lebanon, it came to my mind. The events that affected my
soul in a direct way started in 1982 when America permitted the Israelis to
invade Lebanon and the American Sixth Fleet helped them in that. This
bombardment began and many were killed and injured and others were
terrorized and displaced. And that day, it was confirmed to me that
oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a
deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while
resistance is terrorism and intolerance 20 .

Jenkins (2006:39) suggests that one of the most important components of a
counterterrorism strategy is “devis(ing) innovative measures to reduce the potential
number of terrorist organizations that may seek nuclear weapons by addressing the
motivations of non-state actor groups”. We must begin to understand and address what
leads people to join terrorist organizations and subsequently seek the acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Further, she suggests that the United States gain a better understanding
of the consequences of their foreign policies on others. In particular, an evaluation of the
unintended consequences of such policies is needed. An understanding of the relationship
between terrorism, grievances and international relations including an appreciative stance
toward the “entire environment and culture in which non-state actors exist in light of the
goals they wish to achieve” is more informative than a rational choice approach to
terrorism (Jenkins 2006:40). The coupling of these suggestions implies that Jenkins
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The full transcript of Osama bin Laden’s tape is available at:
http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=7403
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(2006) recognizes the relationship between structures, international relations, and
individual as well as group motivations.
Terrorism emerges from political crises and it is continually reshaped and
reinforced by those crises. Achieving an understanding of the processes that leads to
various forms of terrorism would require a more open ended type of sociology. Sociology
in the era of globalization, if done properly, should move us closer to more reasonable
foreign policies. For example, if sociologists were sent to Iraq, they would be able to shed
light on the conditions under which Hussein was removed, that Iraq is not ready for a
democracy, particularly a democracy promoted from the outside, and that any attempt to
do so will ultimately fail.
More appreciative sociological, criminological and economic research would
move away from examining terrorism from the perspective of only wanting to prevent it
and towards a desire to understand terrorism for the act itself. For instance, Robinson
(1996) addresses the importance of understanding motivations within a larger context. He
claims that neither terrorists nor the counterterrorist state can be judged simply on their
intentions. Instead, “behavioral analysis is structurally contingent” and the “events and
outcomes of the social universe cannot be explained by the intentions of the individual
actors or decisions based on role perception” (Robinson 1996:5). What is necessary then,
is a structurally based analysis of policy and motivation that considers what the actors
involved actually do, rather than what they claim to do.
An examination of terrorism that accounts for terrorism as a phenomenon within
the totality, rather than within the agent will result in “more precise models of the
constitution of society” (Alsted 2001:5). Routine activities theory, of which motivation is
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a part, might be more effective in explaining terrorism and counterterrorism if motivation
played a more central role within theory and research. A more appreciative examination
of motivation, within routine activities theory, suggests that if we were able to reduce the
motivation (anger, frustration, despair etc.) of “possible offenders”, terrorism would be
reduced. Therefore, instead of relying on deterrence, we can approach terrorism with a
more complete understanding of motivation; those conditions that will reduce motivation
as well as those that will increase motivation. Such an analysis may also expose more
about our modern world than simply the terrorism/counterterrorism dynamic.
Motivation does not necessarily have to be examined within the context of a
theory. Examining motivation as a concept in itself can lead to an assessment that will
ultimately lead to a larger theory that includes motivation as a concept. Motivational
approaches may reveal whether or not terrorists have a specific goal or goals. For
instance, Durkheimians find that to assume that all human action has a purposive quality
is reductionist thinking. Regardless of whether an identifiable goal is present however,
part of conceptualizing motivation requires “recognition of the relevance of internal
behavior (perception, beliefs, purpose)” (Gibbs 1989:331).
Rational Choice, Motivation and Culture
Cultural factors are also left out of rational choice analyses of terrorism.
Malesevic (2002) claims that rational choice theories do not incorporate and account for
cultural values and the political contexts in which agents act. When culture, including the
political environment is neglected, cultural attitudes, beliefs, values and ideologies are all
reduced to utilitarian values. Since rational choice assumes that all human action is
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motivated by rational self interest, it presupposes the answer to the question it is applied
to and therefore becomes difficult to falsify. For instance, when applied to terrorism,
rational choice assumes that terrorism is not the result of a collective level of irrationality
or mental illness. Instead, since all humans are rational, utility seeking actors, terrorists
choose terrorism because it is the least costly choice when compared to other options for
attaining their goals. When all actions are reduced to the maximization of profit, we learn
little about where people’s motivations come from other than a desire to increase
benefits. Analysis of larger social contexts such as culture, is shut down, or at least
strongly discouraged within rational choice theory.
Rational choice does not incorporate cultural factors into individual decisions
because it is assumed that all individuals have similar motives. Under rational choice
theory, all humans have utilitarian motives, but actors can have motives, aspirations, or
even preferences that are not strictly utilitarian. For example, humans may be motivated
by emotions such as fear, anger or anxiety, or other categories such as altruism
(Malesevic 2002). Boudon (1989:207-208) proposes two types of human action that are
not determined by utilitarian ends: axiological and situated rationality. Axiological
actions are social actions that are rooted in values instead of ends, and situated rationality
occurs when actors have ‘good reasons’ for pursuing an action. The reasons for their
actions are often driven by strong belief systems as well as the actor’s internal motives.
Ann Swidler (1986) proposes a critique of rational choice theory for its lack of
cultural incorporation into the explanatory project of human action. Her critique focuses
on the assumption that when culture does play a role in the decision making process, it is
understood that culture shapes people’s ends or goals for taking a specified course of
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action. Therefore, cultural values shape individual’s goals, which cause their behavior.
Instead of placing culture as the source of goals, Swidler (1986:272) suggests that culture
actually informs and shapes the means through which people act. Culture, and its
relationship to structures, provides a ‘tool kit’ with which people can form ‘strategies of
action”. Therefore, action becomes part of these strategies which are ultimately shaped or
informed by culture and structures. Culture can also be constraining because it informs
and also limits the optional strategies of approaching action available to people. When
culture is not incorporated as part of rational choice explanations of behavior, we miss
the important relationship between structure, cultural tools, strategies and action.
Similarly, the assumed rationality, intentionality and meaningfulness of actions
provide little in the way of analysis. Attempts to explain a phenomenon are supposed to
differentiate between factors in degree of importance “in order to highlight the reasons,
motives and origins of certain types of actions or events” (Malesevic (2002:204). When
rational choice theorists are asked to explain radical actions such as suicidal action
(suicide bombers, kamikaze pilots) they admit that the roots of action stemming from
social sources are not readily accessible. Since we know little about the relationship
between social contexts, values, motivations, emotions and action, we should rule out the
social and cultural contexts as explanatory devices, according to rational choice.
Therefore, the reduction of human behavior to economics, where all decisions are
treated with the explanation of maximizing utility, means that rational choice theory is “
unable not only to account for non-economic and non-materialist sources of individual
motivation, but also for the structural determinants” of individual and collective actions
(Malesevic 2002:208). The inability of rational choice to account for the variability of
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motivation as rooted in structures is particularly problematic in situations where the
“structural conditions of choices are very unequal” (Maelsevic 2002:208).
In order to move away from rational choice theory’s circularity, Malesevic (2002)
recommends examining the structural and situational determinants that influence the
context in which the actions under investigation arise. She recommends that researchers
focus on variables such as shared values, memories and ideological convictions to name
a few, that would begin to illuminate the contexts in which terrorism occurs and may
provide more comprehensive explanations of terrorism.
Alternative Theories
Some researchers are making efforts to move beyond strict deterrence models of
terrorism (Black 2004; Young 2003). Other criminological theories such as defiance, and
crime as structured action, offer expansive or alternative approaches to understanding
terrorism that move beyond our conceptions of rational choice by attempting to
illuminate the connections between culture, structures, actions and consequences. These
theories begin to inquire not just about social structures, but also promote an
understanding of motivation that is not reduced to instrumental motivation. Researchers
such as Black (2004) and Sherman (1993) expand on rational choice theories in order to
address motivational factors as well as some of the drawbacks of traditional deterrence
theories. Similarly, cultural criminologist Jock Young (2003) focuses on motivation, the
foreground of the terrorist experience, and the existential foreground of terrorism in order
to critique traditional utilitarian approaches to understanding and combating terrorism.
Katz (1988) offers an approach to understanding crimes based on the criminal
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interpretation of the act as one that gives identity and meaning to the transgressor’s life.
Finally, Goodwin (2006) addresses the role of motivation within a larger theory of
categorical terrorism. What follows is a brief summary of these researchers’ work in
order to demonstrate that alternative theories of terrorism exist despite strict adherence to
deterrence policies and practices.
Donald Black (2004) proposes a sociological theory of the geometry of terrorism
that stems from routine activities theory and the process of globalization. He considers
terrorism and counterterrorism efforts as acts of social control that reciprocate each other
in what he terms “the logic of retaliation” (Black 2004:22). Both terrorism and responses
to it are explained in terms of social geometry-“its multidimensional location and
direction in social space” and physical geometry. His theory states that for a terrorist act
to occur, terrorists must have a grievance and be situated in a specific social and
geographical geometry. Black (2004) suggests that neither the social/physical location
nor the grievance alone will lead to a terrorist incident. Instead, both elements are
necessary for terrorism to occur.
Additionally, technological innovations have made physical distance less
important and access to civilian targets easier. As opportunities to commit terrorism
increase, what motivates the terrorist becomes increasingly important. “As the relevance
of physical geometry declines, the fatefulness of social geometry rises. The social
geometry of the grievance becomes not merely a necessary but a sufficient condition for
terrorism” (Black 2004:22).
However, he does not advocate a need to understand the motivation of terrorist
groups or individuals. Black does not suggest analyzing grievances or motivations
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because he hypothesizes that the very conditions that have made terrorism easier through
the shrinking of physical space are also the very conditions that will lead to terrorism’s
decline. He proposes that terrorism will also eventually decline because the decrease in
physical space also leads to a decrease in social space. When social space decreases, the
demarcation of morality or the ability to clearly identify an enemy is reduced in clarity,
making targets less readily identifiable. Black (2004) attributes the polarization of people
and the collective level of violence occurring throughout the world as a result of large
gaps in social space, in which the division between right and wrong is clearly defined an
we are capable of distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Therefore, as physical space
shrinks, the social space that currently allows for the polarization and collectivization of
violence also shrinks (Black 2004). Although he recognizes the role of grievances or
motivations, he does not seem to suggest that understanding those motives is important to
combating terrorism because 1) terrorism will ultimately die out and 2) terrorist
motivations are not always clearly stated or defined. What is important is to recognize
that grievance exists within a particular geographic and social space, but not to
necessarily understand the grievance.
Further, Black’s (2004) 21 theory of the geometry of terrorism is a form of what he
calls pure sociology. In order for his theory to be pure sociology, it must be free of
psychology and not be concerned with means or ends. For Black (2004) violence does
not originate in individuals or collectivities, in beliefs or frustrations. Instead, violence is
a structure, and it is the structure of violence that kills people. Therefore, terrorism is not
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Because Black (2004) believes that terrorism is a form of social control, and not a crime in a moralistic
sense, that criminology is not the right approach to understanding terrorism. Instead, he suggests that the
study of terrorism belongs to the same realm of investigation as law and social control

52

a matter of means ends rationality within an individual agent. Rather, terrorism occurs as
part of a larger structure of reciprocal violence.
While Black (2004) uses a modified version of routine activities theory, Sherman
(1993) extends the idea of deterrence to suggest that deterrence and punishment that is
perceived to be illegitimate or unfair can lead to defiance. Sherman (1993) suggests that
legal sanctions can have one of three possible effects on future crimes. Sanctions can
increase, decrease or have no effect on the occurrence of future crimes. His theory of
defiance is an attempt to explain the situations in which punishment may actually
increase the likelihood that a crime will occur or be repeated. While still rooted in
deterrence, Sherman (1993) suggests that deterrence is conditioned through shaming,
which transpires when punishment is perceived as legitimate and fair. Those punishments
that are perceived to be unjust or excessive may lead to defiance and therefore future
criminal activity. Although Sherman (1993) does not theorize terrorism directly, the
application of his theory of defiance to terrorism suggests that the motivation for future
terrorist acts could stem from attempts to deter and punish potential and actual terrorists
through defiance. Defiance, as deterrence can be specific (individual) or general
(collective). While focused on crime, Sherman (1993) claims that defiance theory may be
applied as a general theory that is capable of explaining various offenses (even terrorism)
because the effect of sanctions is different depending on the social setting, the offenders
and offenses as well as the level of analysis (Sherman 1993).
Various researchers find support for Sherman’s (1993) defiance hypothesis
including a defiant response to counterterrorism deterrence strategies. For instance,
LaFree (2006) finds that some counterterrorism deterrent acts may in fact produce a
53

defiance effect. In his study of pre-9/11 terrorist acts and deterrent responses, he finds
that “three out of five interventions were associated with a significant increase in the
likelihood of subsequent attacks” (Newswise 2006). Similarly, Frey and Luechinger
(2002) claim that some deterrence policies may backfire, increasing terrorist acts. Since
the attacks on September 11th, the number of terrorist incidents has increased
internationally (Johnson 2004:xxii). Similar to terrorism, researchers who explored the
deterrent effects of nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union found that deterrent policies
were just as likely to provoke the Soviet Union into an attack, as they were to deter
attacks. Researchers concluded that deterrence and provocation both involve making
threats, and therefore intimately related (Black and Pole 1983). In particular, they identify
the centralization of polity and economy that occurs in response to a previous terrorist
attack as a poor deterrence approach.
Although researchers identify possible defiance effects associated with
deterrence, their suggestions for a more appropriate counterterrorism strategy still adhere
to rational choice theory. For instance, Frey and Luechinger (2006) suggest that rather
than attempting to deter terrorism through increasing the costs of engaging in terrorism,
counterterrorism policy should focus on decreasing the benefit of terrorist acts. Whereas
Frey and Luechinger (2006) suggest that policy should focus on decreasing the perceived
benefits of engaging in terrorism, Uri Fisher (2007) adds that both increasing the costs
and decreasing the benefits are necessary for deterrence to be effective.
Moving away from the psychological background of offenders, such as their
rational decision making processes, Jack Katz (1988:3) proposes an understanding of
criminality that focuses on the “seductive qualities of crimes: those aspects in the
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foreground of criminality that make its various forms sensible, even sensually compelling
ways of being”. He links the seductive quality of deviance to “moral emotions” including
humiliation, vengeance and righteousness. What Katz (1988:9) finds is that people are
attracted to the criminal act in order to surmount some “personal challenge to moral - not
material - existence”. Katz (1988) suggests moving beyond the “dry” materialist theories
that reduce criminality to an actor’s instrumental choice by moving us toward an
understanding of the nature of the act itself. He asks us to, “consider the many sensually
explosive, diabolically creative, realities of crime that the materialist sentiment cannot
appreciate” (Katz 1988:314) In other words, what is the lived experience of someone who
commits crime, or in this case terrorism? How do they go come to the point of
committing a terrorist act? Gallagher (2004) in his application of Katz to suicide bombers
asks, “How and why is one morally and sensually attracted to carrying out a suicide
mission?”. According to Katz (2000), a person who commits an act of terrorism may find
it self-affirming, or a way to construct meaning for their lives. For instance, do people
become willing to commit suicide bombing because that act will provide a meaningful
interpretation for their life? 22
Similar to Katz (1988) cultural criminologists such as Jock Young (2003)
disagree with any strictly rational choice, routine activities or deterrence approach to
understanding terrorism. Young (2003:391) claims that cultural criminology demands
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Similar to Katz’s and Young’s phenomenological experience of terrorism is Messerschmidt’s (1997)
theory of “crime as structured action” where Messerschmidt is connecting structure and identity. He claims
that one of the essential components to understanding crime in general is the notion that structure and
action are essentially inseparable. As with Giddens (2002), Messerschmidt (1997) illuminates the
interaction between structure and agency as cyclical and reciprocal where structures act as both
constraining and guiding forces of behavior and behaviors reconstitute structures. In other words, social
structures are “realized through social action and social action requires structure as its condition”
(Messerschmidt 1997:5).
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that the “existential foreground” of criminal acts be explored. The “existential
foreground” includes the structures, culture, geography, identity and context in which
crime occurs. The inclusion of both the background and the foreground moves beyond
the instrumental reasons for engaging in crime by examining the trangressive nature of
crime. Therefore, what is important for criminologists is to understand the structures
within which human actions such as crime occur and the ways our responses to criminal
action are shaped by the same structures.
Similarly, when the foreground of terrorism is examined, it reveals the
“intensity” of motivation while linking that foreground to various background factors
such as politics, economic deprivation, anger and hostility. This approach demonstrates
that terrorist actions are not the premeditated acts of rationally calculating actors, but are
also transgressive in nature in the face of increasing relative deprivation and the crises of
identity that Young (2003) partially attributes to globalization. What is important for
Young (2003) is for those who study violent phenomena such as terrorism avoid
narrowly focusing on just the structural or just the instrumental agency of individual and
group actors. Instead, those who study terrorism must emphasize the structural conditions
under which terrorism occurs while also understanding how those structures influence
human agency and the available courses of action (Young 2003). Young’s (2003)
advocacy of the incorporation of situating actors within structures suggests that rational
choice shuts down the possibility of making those types of connections theoretically.
Goodwin (2006) discusses motivation directly as part of a larger theory of
categorical terrorism. His critique of current terrorism research includes the use of
grievances by social scientists as a basis for terrorism. Goodwin (2006) claims that
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grievance based explanations are not sufficient because such theories assume that once
the grievance is removed, terrorism will no longer be chosen as a pathway of protest. The
major weakness in grievance based theories is the fact that they do not specify which
grievances motivate terrorism, which grievances do not lead to terrorism and which
grievances could therefore be addressed in order to prevent terrorism.
Goodwin (2006:2033) states, “Grievances may be a necessary cause of collective
action, but it is less clear how they cause people to act in the ways they do. In fact, ends
do not explain means any better than they justify them”. In order to better understand the
role of motivation, particularly grievance based motivation, Goodwin (2006) suggests we
examine how terrorists “socially construct” their grievances. For instance, we should gain
a better understanding of how terrorists come to blame certain sectors of the population,
other societies, or civilians for their grievances. Therefore, Goodwin (2006) is also
advancing a theory of contextualizing terrorism that promotes inquiry into the
relationship between structures, motivation and actions.
All of these theories provide a step in the direction of making links between the
terrorist actor and the social conditions in which the actor is located. Whether we need to
examine social geometry, defiance, the foreground of actions or specific nature of
grievances, all of these theorists are attempting to move past the rational actor, means
ends oriented understanding of terrorism. In particular, they all appear to stress the
importance of locating the actor within social structures.
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Conclusion
This chapter offered a critique of rational choice and routine activities theories by
giving examples of the problematic nature of methodological individualism and
instrumentalism. In particular, the lack of attention paid to the role of motivation within
both theories was explicated. I demonstrated that deterrence does not enable us to analyze
structural motivation or its relationship to individual actors; a connection that is necessary
given the global context of terrorism. Finally, alternative theories of terrorism offer ways
to move beyond the confines of the rational actor model of understanding terrorism. The
following chapter addresses the consequences of our continued use of deterrence as a
counterterrorism strategy.
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Chapter III
Consequences of Deterrence
Introduction
If rational choice and deterrence approaches to terrorism are problematic
theoretically, analytically and practically. What effect do these policies have? Who is
gaining and who is losing a war on terror based on deterrence? In this chapter, I argue
that deterrence theory has the consequence of de-politicizing terrorism. Further, I argue
that this counterterrorism strategy is beneficial for elites, but dangerous for the
international general public. When terrorism is labeled a threat to democracy and
freedom (free market enterprise), people who fear terrorism are convinced to do whatever
it takes to secure their way of life. Political and economic elites offer a strategy of
deterrence in order to prevent terrorism, but through the process of implementing
deterrence policies, wealth and power become increasingly concentrated within the upper
echelons of society. This chapter outlines the various ways in which deterrence policies
impact the distribution of political and economic power in that order.
Rational Choice as Hegemonic Thought
Rational choice and routine activities theory are common sense, intuitive theories;
they are tangibly implemented and appeal to historical notions of punishment, prevention
and retribution. Harvey (2005:5) claims that, “For any way of thought to become
dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeal to our intuitions and
instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social
world we inhabit. If successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in
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common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question.” Similar to Harvey
(2005), in discussing the aftermath of 9/11, Ackerman (2006) proposes that in the midst
of panic, the government’s response to the attacks appealed to human rationality. Efforts
by the government to demonstrate their swiftness to enact laws to protect the United
States and to respond to the terrorists through military action appealed to collective
human emotions. If the deterrence paradigm can be characterized as “dominant thought”,
who benefits from adhering to a deterrence model of terrorism? Who is threatened by
alternative theories of terrorism, including examinations of international political and
economic structures?
Economic incentives explain part of the hegemony of deterrence, but not all of it.
The government also has a political stake in conforming to the rational choice paradigm.
“The government may…prefer a deterrence policy, because they can therewith
demonstrate to the population that they are determined to ‘fight terrorism at all costs’.
The ‘macho’ - image may help them to win elections, especially if there is no open
discussion of the merits and demerits of various strategies” (Frey and Luechinger
2003:246). Deterrence serves elite interests because efforts to deter terrorism support
various businesses financially, provides a political platform for politicians and therefore
reinforces present power structures.
The interests of organizations such as the state, corporations, military and law
enforcement are not aligned with a strategy of reducing terrorism through non-deterrence
means. One reason for this lack of interest in alternatives may be due to the fact that these
same organizations will lose funding and profits that they have received through the
implementation of a deterrence strategy.
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Alternatives may also be perceived as illegitimate. For instance, alternative
explanations are viewed as tantamount to justification of terrorist acts. Two months after
the Twin Towers were attacked, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni produced
a pamphlet condemning academics of “[blaming] America first.” This type of
condemnation coupled with calls for patriotism, discussions of good and evil as well as
the “virtue(s) of a free society” 23 attest to the reluctance of politicians 24 and academic
organizations to support more complex understandings of terrorism. With this kind of
pressure, according to Wallerstein, academics are not being encouraged to attempt
formulating responses to the question of why terrorists attacked the U.S. on September
11th. Alternative strategies may not require the use of these same (state, military,
business) organizations and corporations to the extent that a deterrence policy employs
them (Frey and Luechinger 2003:246). In fact, alternative understandings of terrorism
that explore political, economic and cultural processes may expose the inability of
rational choice to illuminate the global context of terrorism or the consequences of
counterterrorism policies based on deterrence.
Terrorism as Political Violence
Operating under the assumption that agents’ reasons for their actions can be
reduced to a cost benefit calculation is problematic not just theoretically, but also
politically (Giddens 2002). When the motives of actors are disregarded, politicians are
not encouraged to inquire about the social context in which terrorism arises. The focus on
deterrence rather than motivation suggests that politicians and theorists do not recognize
23

As quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein’s presentation titled “America and the World: The Twin Towers as
Metaphor”.
24
Lynne Cheney and Senator Lieberman are both founders of the Council.
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that “all actors …have some degree of penetration of the social forms which oppress
them” (Giddens 2002:240).
The individual cost benefit rationale that deterrence theory assumes terrorists
operate under eliminates the political context of terrorism. Therefore, within rational
choice theory, terrorist acts are not part of a larger political project. In fact, rational
choice theory places an emphasis on economic and material goals. As Moghaddam
(2006:24) suggests, it is certainly possible that terrorists are rationally motivated to gain
geographic territories or even material or natural resources. However, in the process of
committing terrorist acts, terrorists often destroy material resources and sometimes
destroy themselves. He suggests that acts such as suicidal terrorism are inconsistent with
materialist motivation. Therefore, the deterrence paradigm removes terrorist acts out of
the political realm. By rethinking terrorist explanations, we change how we interpret
terrorist acts i.e. politically. For instance, a deterrence approach to terrorism does not
facilitate the inclusion of political and structural inequalities into the terrorism discourse;
thereby making terrorism apolitical. Conversely, when terrorism is understood within a
global context, not only are the structural inequalities revealed, but the political context
of terrorism, by definition becomes apparent.
Deterrence, as a counterterrorism strategy does not regard terrorist acts as
political, even though terrorism is recognized as a political act by definition. Although no
agreed upon definition of terrorism exists, there are some common elements among the
varying definitions. For instance, Moghadam (2006:4) claims that terrorism is
fundamentally a political concept that describes violent action in pursuit of a political
goal. Violence as a pathway to achieving political change is what differentiates terrorism
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from crime in general. A further distinction between crime and terrorism lies within the
assumption that crimes are committed in pursuit of material or personal gain 25 , whereas
terrorism is politically motivated violence (Moghadam 2006, Frey and Luechinger 2003).
Therefore, Moghadam (2006:5) defines terrorism as “premeditated violence, or threat of
violence, in the pursuit of a political aim, perpetrated by organizations primarily against
noncombatant targets, and usually aimed at influencing a wider audience through the
creation of fear”. Similarly, the Homeland Security Act defines terrorism as acts that are
in violation of United States laws, violent or intended to endanger human life that are
premised on influencing or intimidating policies or government (Dohrn 2003:133).
Placing terrorism within a political understanding of rationality may bring in other
cultural, historical interpretations as well as illuminate global injustices. For example,
moving toward a political understanding of terrorism may reveal the motives of terrorists
that stem from inequalities. Terrorists might be motivated by a desire to improve their
global position politically, economically, or socially. Factors that contribute to political
motivations include foreign occupation, repression and a perceived lack of political
freedom. After September 11th, the list of grievances the terrorists expressed collectively
included the occupation of Middle Eastern lands, the colonization of Arab states as well
as support for the Israeli state. Additionally, the terrorists expressed outrage at the
exploitation of their natural resources (oil) and the relative poverty of those in the Middle
East compared to the West, who are benefiting from those natural resources. Other
contemporary examples of political occupational that resulted in terrorism include Israel
25

The assumption by Moghadam (2006) that we can understand crime as strictly materially motivated is
problematic for similar reasons that understanding terrorism in such a fashion is problematic. Nonetheless,
he is pointing out that terrorism is understood to be politically motivated, yet is responded to as though it
were materially motivated.
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and Palestine as well as the French occupation of Algeria. All of these motivations can be
understood as collective grievances, rather than simply the basis of individual choices.
Terrorism could be viewed as a pathway to gaining power within the political
realm as well as a way to decrease the power of other political actors. From a political
perspective, terrorism can be understood as “asymmetric warfare” (Moghadam 2006,
Cooper 2007). In other words, it is people of differing resources conducting war.
Asymmetric warfare occurs when one group is militarily, politically and/or economically
weaker than its opponent. Terrorist tactics are employed when the weaker group is
incapable of employing the tactics of legitimate war used by stronger states. Methods of
asymmetric warfare include “using… weapons in ways that are difficult to prevent or
defend against, employing the element of surprise, altering the battle space; attempting to
make use of all segments of its society, and targeting large segments of the enemy’s
population” (Moghadam 2006:39) One example of a terrorist tactic that contains all of
these elements is the suicide bombing used in places such as the West Bank where
suicide bombings are hard to protect against, contain the element of surprise and induce
mass fear. If groups are attempting to engage in terrorism in order to alter the political
landscape, terrorism then becomes a political strategy to address collective grievances
rather than a means ends decision based on individual material benefits. Deterrence depoliticizes terrorism by ignoring its collective political bases that supply motivation for
individual and collective actors.
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Political Consequences of Counterterrorism
If terrorism is essentially a political tactic, what effect does our deterrence as
counterterrorism doctrine have on the political landscape? Adhering to a deterrence
strategy to combat terrorism, including preemptive strikes, may bolster the legitimacy of
the government actors and their policies within the domestic front 26 . One problem for
liberal democracies is that when those in power do not sufficiently exhibit that their
ability to protect their public, the government loses legitimacy and politicians risk losing
their office (Enders and Sandler 2006:27). As Frey and Luechinger (2003) note, when
those who hold office fail to show they are willing to do whatever it takes to fight
terrorism, the current administration loses legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
From the Spanish-American conflict, through the Cold War era and now the ‘war
on terror’ the power of the executive branch of government has increased compared to
other government entities such as Congress. An explanation for the transition of power
include the difficulty Congress has in running wars because of its many chiefs rather than
centralization under the Commander in Chief (Eland 2004). Most recently, President
Bush declared that Congress’s current role in the ‘war on terror’ is to provide and
approve funding for security efforts and the troops and not to act as conductors of war
(Bush, Press Briefing 2007).
When legitimacy is weakened, politicians not only risk losing their offices, but the
entire structure of the democratic system may be called into question (Chomsky 1996) 27 .

26
27

It may simultaneously reduce the government’s legitimacy elsewhere.

A loss of legitimacy for the state may also mean an increase in terrorist acts. According
to defiance theory, when punishment is viewed as illegitimate or unfair, crime or
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Maintaining the deterrence rhetoric and policies that demonstrate a determination to rid
the world of terrorists may be one avenue of maintaining the legitimacy of the political
actors involved in our current democratic system, as well as efforts to fight terrorism such
as the war in Iraq and the use of Guantanamo Bay. This legitimacy is based on providing
both economic security as well as security from violence. An additional way that
individual incumbents are able to strengthen the likelihood of reelection in the new war
on terror is by acquiring security grants for their constituents from the Department of
Homeland Security. Further, “per capita funding is related to electoral votes per capita,
i.e., to the politics of the Presidential re-election (Coats, Karahan and Tollison 2006:275).
The war on terror has become not just an element of the dominant ideology it has also
become a source of pork-barrel resources.
The government’s rhetoric of ridding the world of terrorists through a “war on
terror” offers an unending source of justification for deterrence-based strategies. “By
characterizing the response (to terrorism) as a war, the proactive government gives a false
impression of a possible victory in which terrorism will eventually be defeated…but
terrorism, especially transnational terrorism, remains a tactic that will be embraced by
new members and new groups” (Enders and Sandler 2006:89). Therefore, as long as
deterrence appears to be working (we have not had another attack on U.S. soil), but only
to a certain extent (insurgency in Iraq, attempted attacks internationally) the government
will be supported in continuing to allocate more funds to counterterrorism and the war.
Some of these resources can be captured to support elite economic power.

terrorism will increase or continue. Within the rational choice paradigm, the utility of
terrorism as a form of protest increases when legitimacy is reduced.
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The deterrence strategy promoted by the Bush Administration is also
advantageous politically because the threat of terrorism and the call for counterterrorism
act as a distraction from domestic issues. The diversion from domestic policy issues such
as health care, poverty, education and unemployment was met simultaneously with the
collective “domestic mobilization” that called for counterterrorism measures in the face
of America’s newly discovered vulnerability after September 11th (Hoffman 2006:122).
Therefore, as long as politicians are doing everything possible to combat the threat of
terrorism, their political clout is maintained. People who view the terrorist threat as more
important than other domestic issues are going to vote for politicians that make
counterterrorism a priority. Similarly, citizens are willing to have their tax dollars spent
on security measures in order to deter terrorism rather than on education, public support
programs or welfare systems. The threat of terrorism allows for the maintenance of
structural power and the funding supporting security measures.
The domestic mobilization to combat terror has come at the cost of civil liberties,
which Americans have submitted to in the name of patriotism and protection. The decline
in civil liberties allows the government more leeway to exercise deterrent measures in the
name of doing everything it takes to prevent another terrorist attack. Objections to
policies that are supposed to help protect the United States, even if they violate civil
liberties are tantamount to supporting terrorism or at least acting unpatriotically.
Therefore, the reduction in civil liberties gives the government more control through fear
and a decreased ability for the citizenry to object.
The threat to civil liberties lends strength to the government to employ various
deterrence practices in the name of combating terrorism that might not otherwise be
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acceptable. The “war on terror”, as with other wars has also increased the power not only
of the government in general, but the executive branch in particular. Therefore, efforts to
promote democracy abroad and fight terrorists in unknown regions of the world are
fundamentally at odds with a truly democratic process at home. A process that is
reducing individuals’ power as well as the power of congressional elected officials; gives
the executive branch unchecked decision making power in the name of a democratic
collectivity. In other words, in the process of defending democracy through deterrence
measures (domestic spying program etc) government actors are reducing democracy at
home.
When wars require domestic mobilization of civilian resources and the private
sector for support such as WWI, WWII and the present ‘war on terror’ the executive
branch and the president are the “only entit(ies) capable” of mass mobilization and
organization (Eland 2004:188-189). Bush’s assertion that his role is to run the war and
Congress’s role is essentially to support him reflects this ideology that the Commander in
Chief is the most efficient means of making decisions in a time of war. When asked what
he thought about Congress taking away his decision making power through legislation,
Bush replied, “I don’t think Congress ought to be running the war… I'll work with
Congress; I'll listen to Congress. Congress has got all the right to appropriate money. But
the idea of telling our military how to conduct operations, for example, or how to deal
with troop strength, I don't think it makes sense. I don't think it makes sense today, nor do
I think it's a good precedent for the future” (Bush, 2007). Now, deterrence policies allow
the President unprecedented power to exercise force in the name of protecting and
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promoting democracy. Centralized power gives that section of elites allied to President
Bush greater flexibility and more prerogatives in policy-making.
“After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush has used the
perceived need for extensive government action to prevent future attacks to extend the
accrual of executive power into the twenty-first century” (Eland 2004:189). One example
of the extension of power to the executive branch was supported by Congress through the
passing and re-approval of the USA PATRIOT ACT that allows for domestic
surveillance and increased police powers. Similarly, the newly created Office of
Homeland Security is a counterterrorist agency that is only responsible for answering to
the president. In other words, the agency has no congressional oversight (Kellner 2003).
The decrease in congressional power alongside the increase in executive powers
has obvious consequences for the checks and balances system that American democracy
was built upon. Presently, Congress people are more reluctant to assert their power
through denying a declaration of war or refusing to approve increased budgetary
spending for conflicts including terrorism because they may be concerned that any
attempt to do so could jeopardize their ability to be reelected 28 .

Economic Consequences of Counterterrorism
If deterrence is a flawed counterterrorism policy, what impact do counterterrorism
efforts have economically? Who benefits from these policies? Are all people
economically secured or have benefits gone to a select few? This section will address
28

The recent war spending bill in Congress that approved $184 billion if a stipulation was present for a
specific date for the withdraw of troops from Iraq may be one exception to the idea that congress is
unwilling to check executive power. However, President Bush has threatened to veto any bill that includes
a troop withdraw stipulation (Wright 2007)
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these questions through a world systems perspective. Various companies have received
huge contracts as a result of the Iraq war. Some of these companies include Bechtel,
Halliburton, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Imperialism and war are good for
profits for some companies, but not all (Ali 2005:71). Likewise, post war reconstruction
requires a large initial investment by various transnational corporations. War and post
war reconstruction by transnational corporations in Afghanistan and Iraq brings these
countries further into the world capitalist system in which resources are extracted and are
sent to the core countries (the West). For example, Klein (2003) points out,
reconstructing areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan is only part of the U.S. future economic
plans. Iraq, for instance, “is being treated as a blank slate on which the most ideological
Washington neoliberals can design their dream economy: fully privatized, foreign owned
and open for business” (Klein 2003:14).
Reconstruction, democracy promotion and security contracts do not benefit a
majority of Iraqis or a majority of Americans. Thus far, the Middle East is considered to
be one of the areas to suffer from increasing poverty from globalization and capitalist
incorporation (Chua 2003:245). The increasing poverty is due to the fact that money and
resources are being extracted from the Middle East and Afghanistan and sent to areas in
theWest such as the United States. As Chua (2003:246) claims, while the United States is
wealthy and exploits developing nations by using the World Bank, IMF and
multinational corporations, people living in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are poor,
hungry, powerless and angry.
While the Middle East, like much of the developing world, is experiencing an
increase in poverty, U.S. companies are increasing their profits. Unequal exchange is an
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essential feature of the world market economy where strong states benefit from the
exploitation of weaker states (Wallerstein 1997:40) For instance, Bechtel Corporation
received a $680 billion (later increased by $1.03 billion) contract to perform
infrastructure development in Iraq including sewers and electric grids. The contract
between Halliburton Company and Iraq oil fields has been met with controversy (and
violence) because of Vice President Dick Cheney’s prior involvement with the company.
After several years of sliding profits, Bechtel Corp. reported unprecedented earnings at
the end of 2003 with reported revenues of $16.3 billion (Baker 2004).
Lockheed Martin is the top U.S. defense contractor with reported profits of $830
million (an increase of 41%) in the first half of 2005. As of August 2005, Lockheed
projected sales in the $38 billion range with outstanding orders worth $73 billion dollars
(Bauer 2005). Lockheed Martin has contracts in various areas of defense. According to
the World Policy Institute in New York, "Lockheed Martin is now positioned to profit
from every level of the war on terror from targeting to intervention, and from occupation
to interrogation” (Chatterjee, 2005).
Halliburton, an oil and logistics company received $8 billion dollars in contracts
in Iraq in 2003. As of May 5, 2005, Halliburton had completed $10.5 billion worth of
logistical work in Iraq as well as $813 million in Afghanistan. Additionally, Halliburton
is contracted to aid in the reconstruction of the oil industry in Iraq with a price tag of $3.7
billion dollars. Halliburton has also come under fire stemming from accusations of bill
padding for “questionable and unsupported costs”. Finally, Halliburton is responsible for
building and supporting the suspected terrorist containment facility in Guantanamo Bay
and Lockheed Martin has supplied the interrogators (Phinney 2005).
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With Congress approving increased spending for defense in 2006, the various
defense contractors can expect another lucrative year. The budget for fiscal year 2006
was set to increase by 441 billion dollars (an increase of 21% from 2005). Of that,
Congress has approved 79 billion dollars for weapons systems procurement and another
estimated 69 billion for military development and research (Bauer 2005).
The marriage between military contractors such as Halliburton and the Bush
administration, particularly Vice President Dick Cheney, are now well known, but the
extent of the privatization of the “war on terror” is still coming to light. Jeremy Scahill
traces Donald Rumsfeld’s doctrine to further privatize military operations in order to
make the Department of Defense operate more like “venture capitalists” (Scahill 2007:2).
Rumsfeld planned on achieving this goal through private contracts to the Blackwater
Company (as well as other private contractors). Rumsfeld’s plan to reduce the
bureaucratic nature of the Department of Defense through increasing the outsourcing of
military operations was realized with the invasion of Iraq. By 2006, an estimated 100,000
private contractors were operating in Iraq alone not including Afghanistan and other
nations. Since the “war on terror” began, Blackwater secured numerous contracts through
the Department of Defense as well as Congress. Further, the company is well connected
politically. From its infancy, Blackwater has dumped money into Republican Party
candidates, include George W. Bush. Blackwater has also hired J.Cofer Black who was
the head of the counterterrorism unit at the CIA and Joseph Schmitz, who was the
Pentagon Inspector General both during the Bush Administration (Scahill 2007).
The relationship between the current Administration with their policy of
deterrence and private contractors serves Blackwater well as they received more than $1
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billion in war contracts to provide everything from security services to cooks for the
military. The recent call for a troop surge in Iraq is being coupled with an increase in the
number of private contractors to be sent overseas. Kucinich, an investigator who is
looking into violations of military contracts comments,
“it’s the privatization of war…linking private war contractor
profits with war making. So we’re giving incentives for the contractors
to lobby the Administration and the Congress to create more opportunities
for profits, and those opportunities are more war 29 ”.

Conclusion
Terrorism and counterterrorism are best understood when the actions of
individuals and groups are placed within a global context. The global context also
provides a lens through which we can assess the consequences of deterrence domestically
and internationally. Globalization, world systems theory and the promotion of polyarchy
are not critically examined as part of deterrence thinking that then informs
counterterrorism efforts. Instead, deterrence theory shuts down the analysis of terrorism
as a political act by assuming that terrorists engage in violence in the name of material
gain. Further, deterrence policies reinforce the power of political and economic elites.
When these global factors are neglected, we risk not only engaging in reductionist
thinking about terrorism, but actually inciting terrorism. Finally, deterrence as
counterterrorism policy upholds the present international political and economic
structures of power by reinforcing the status quo.

29

As quoted in (Scahill 2007:8)
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Chapter IV
Conclusion
Deterrence is the guiding theory of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Deterrence
emphasizes reducing the attractiveness of terrorism as an option when people engage in
cost-benefit analysis. However, theories of rational choice do not incorporate the global
structures and conditions in which terrorism occurs. Therefore, deterrence decontextualizes and de-historicizes terrorism (Said 1988). Although it is understandable
why rational choice theorists bracket structure and focus on individual actors, the result
of this bracketing is a less than adequate understanding of the terrorism phenomenon.
What is at stake? Particular political and economic structures appear to be upheld
through the use and discourse of deterrence. For instance, the political positions of
various domestic and international actors depend largely upon the way they respond to
terrorism. A tough on terrorism approach, much like the tough on crime approach, is
crucial in order for those in power to remain in power. Similarly, international economic
elites depend on the war on terror to maintain and increase profit margins. Some
corporations are entirely dependent on the ongoing war on terror in order to succeed in
business.
Simultaneously, the domestic and international gap in wealth is increasing.
Whether the benefit is financial security or safety from violence, not all people are
benefiting from efforts to deter terrorism. In the name of fighting the war on terror, the
government has severely altered the civil rights of U.S. citizens, while promoting
“democracy” abroad. The promotion of fear of terrorism at home also promotes the use
of violence as a deterrent abroad.
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Finally, answering terrorism with violence in the name of deterrence or
preemption in the name of prevention may not have the desired effect of deterring
terrorism. In fact, our response to terrorism, may fuel ongoing conflict and violence by
increasing the motivation of terrorists or upholding present inequalities (Sherman 1993).
Recent evidence suggests that the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan have not accomplished
their goals of ending terrorism and implementing democratic governments.
The outlook for “progress” in the war on terrorism through the continued use of
deterrence is not optimistic either. For example, according to the National Intelligence
Estimate, a collaborative of 16 agencies, concludes in their report “The Terrorist Threat
to Homeland Security” that we are facing ongoing and increasing threats to the United
States. Although they claim that al Qaeda perceives the U.S. to be a hardened target that
is less vulnerable then it was on 9/11, the threat of another attack is highly likely.
Further, the report implies that the occupation of Iraq as well as the spread of
Islamic extremism may promote terrorism rather than deter. Although the U.S. claims to
have intercepted some terrorists’ plots, the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan,
targeted killings in Pakistan and Yemen, increased security and intelligence measures are
met with the spread of al Qaeda, an increase in the number of radical Internet sites, and
now a new threat from Hezbollah. These increased threats suggest that terrorists groups
are not deterred by the U.S. occupation and ongoing violence. Rather, the actions of the
U.S. are reinforcing and possibly increasing the collective motivations of terrorists.
Despite the evidence that “some administration policies have been ineffective or have
backfired,” the report states that the U.S. should remain in Iraq or even increase its
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presence there in order to respond to the “network built up” by al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq
(Shane 2007:A1).
Is deterrence effective? To assert that deterrence is an effective means to combat
terrorism is impossible to falsify. What is apparent is that deterrence theory does not
supply us with the most effective means of understanding (combating, thwarting)
terrorism. Further, the terrorism/counterterrorism dynamic is a cyclical process of
violence that does not facilitate understanding the larger context of global inequalities,
collective grievances and identity crises. Until we are willing to think critically about the
modern state of terrorism, we will not have the capability to practically avoid future
atrocities.
If deterrence theory is not the most appropriate means to address terrorism, what
other options are at our disposal? Is there any kind of policy that we could implement to
address terrorism that would not be bound to elite interests, but recognizes terrorism as a
political act? We might begin to formulate new counterterrorism policies based on the
work of cultural criminologists such as Jack Katz, Donald Black and Jock Young. Such
policies would have to recognize that (a) terrorism as a political act that (b) emerges from
real collective grievances. The recognition of both is necessary to move past the
conversion of all grievances to costs and all attempts to remove or reduce those
grievances to benefits. However, given the current constellation of international elite
power, any alternative counterterrorism policy is unlikely to be recognized or
implemented for that matter.
The fact that thinking about and addressing terrorism outside of a deterrence
paradigm is so difficult may suggest that what is necessary in order to really tackle
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terrorism is not a new counterterrorism policy that implicitly presumes the present world
order as given and inalterable, but a restructuring of the later. Such restructuring would
have to be geared toward easing constraints that corporate and political elites place on
society, precisely those constraints that conflict with prevailing cultural norms and
contribute the collective grievances. Creating a more just social order in which people
feel they have a voice in decision making processes and agency over their own lives may
be the only venue for eradicating collective grievances whose most visible manifestation
today is terrorism.
How is the present social order not conducive to reducing, eliminating or making
unnecessary collective grievances? The modern social order places the role of the state as
manager where the responsibility of the state is not to solve social problems, but control
them. Deterrence is how the state chose to manage terrorism, but claimed deterrence was
a way of “solving” or eradicating terrorism. However, deterrence efforts may not only be
ineffective or theoretically insufficient, but deterrence may also “prepare conditions that
will further weaken, or preclude, opportunities to tackle social problems” including
terrorism (Dahms 2005:208).
Despite the apparent unfeasibility of alternative policy options for addressing
terrorism, it is increasingly important for social scientists to critically analyze the present
efforts to combat terrorism. Critiques of deterrent measures are the first step in the
creation not just of alternative policies, but visions of an alternative world order. If social
scientists refrain from engaging in such critiques with the goal of illuminating
alternatives, they run the risk of upholding the present power structures that make those
alternatives appear nonexistent or impossible.
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